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CRIMINAL LAW 
THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT’S MILIEU: 
PENAL REFORM IN THE LATE 
EIGHTEENTH CENTURY 
ERIN E. BRAATZ* 
Conflicting interpretations of the history of the “cruel and unusual 
punishments” clause of the Eighth Amendment play a significant role in 
seemingly never-ending debates within the Supreme Court over the scope of 
that Amendment’s application.  These competing histories have at their 
cores some conception of the specific punishments deemed acceptable at 
the time of the Amendment’s adoption.  These narrow accounts fail, 
however, to seriously engage with the broader history of penal practice and 
reform in the eighteenth century.  This is a critical deficiency as the century 
leading up to the adoption of the Eighth Amendment was a period in which 
penal practices underwent numerous changes and reforms.   
This Article closely examines the experiments in penal reform that 
occurred in the American colonies immediately following the Revolution to 
elucidate what the Founding Generation thought about penal form, how 
and why it might change, and its relationship to the creation of the 
American republic.  It argues that these penal reform movements, which 
have been ignored in discussions of the Eighth Amendment, were well 
known during the founding era.  Furthermore, the salience of these reform 
movements at the time demonstrates a persistent concern among the 
Founders with adopting a more enlightened or civilized penal code in order 
to distinguish the American republic from monarchical practices in 
England and Europe.  Foregrounding the content of both the experiments 
themselves and the debates over penal practice, they reflect yields 
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Nelson for their helpful conversation and comments. 
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important and previously unrecognized insights for our understanding of 
the Eighth Amendment’s meaning and its import at the time it was drafted. 
This Article helps illuminate current debates over the interpretation 
and application of the Eighth Amendment, including the use of international 
comparisons, the idea of evolution or progress, and the concept of 
proportionality.  It also exposes significant gaps and limitations in the 
historical accounts relied upon by the Court to date. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The history of the “cruel and unusual” punishment clause of the Eighth 
Amendment plays a significant role in the ongoing debate over the 
Amendment’s meaning and application.1  Those advocating a narrow 
 
1  See, e.g., Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726, 2749 (2015) (Scalia, J., concurring) 
(arguing that the Court should revisit all Eighth Amendment cases beginning with Trop v. 
Dulles because those cases have departed from “the historical understanding of the Eighth 
Amendment”); Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 966–82 (1991); Solem v. Helm, 463 
U.S. 277, 285–86 (1983) (arguing that the English Bill of Rights embraced the concept of 
proportionality present in earlier documents such as the Magna Carta); Rummel v. Estelle, 
445 U.S. 263, 288–89 (1980) (Powell, J., dissenting) (same); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 
238 passim (1972) (per curiam) (three of the five concurring opinions, as well as the dissent 
examine the history of the Eighth Amendment); Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 389–
97 (1910) (White, J., dissenting) (engaging in extensive discussion of the Eighth 
Amendment’s history in order to refute the majority opinion’s holding that it requires 
proportionality in sentencing); see also JOHN D. BESSLER, CRUEL & UNUSUAL: THE 
AMERICAN DEATH PENALTY AND THE FOUNDERS’ EIGHTH AMENDMENT 31–65 (2012) 
(arguing that Enlightenment authors, especially Cesare Beccaria, greatly influenced the 
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interpretation of the Amendment and those promoting a more expansive 
one each invoke different elements of that history.2  Scholars and Supreme 
Court justices who support a narrow reading claim to engage in a textual 
history akin to statutory interpretation.3 Justices taking this approach argue 
that it  limits the Amendment’s protections to forms of bodily punishment 
and torture considered cruel and unusual in 1791.4  This approach 
problematically ignores the context out of which the text emerged, even 
while ultimately relying on a narrow understanding of the form 
punishments took in the colonies.5 
Those who argue for a broader interpretation engage in a more 
contextual analysis, pointing to the ideas and beliefs held at the time the 
Amendment was adopted, either concerning the rights of Englishmen 
generally or the writings of the Enlightenment.6  However, this approach 
completely ignores the penal context, seemingly conceding the point that 
punishments in 1791 were more cruel than those found today.  Ultimately, 
 
Founders); Charles W. Schwartz, Eighth Amendment Proportionality Analysis and the 
Compelling Case of William Rummel, 71 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 378, 378–82 (1980); 
Deborah Schwartz & Jay Wishingrad, The Eighth Amendment, Beccaria, and the 
Enlightenment: An Historical Justification for the Weems v. United States Excessive 
Punishment Doctrine, 24 BUFF. L. REV. 783, 784–85 (1974) (same).   
2  For example, compare Furman, 408 U.S. at 242–45, 254–55 (1972) (Douglas, J., 
concurring) (interpreting history to indicate that the founders were particularly concerned 
with discrimination), and id. at 259–65 (Brennan, J., concurring) (arguing that the history 
does not provide much illumination as to the Amendment’s meaning), and id. at 319–23 
(White, J., concurring) (finding that the history of the clause “clearly establishes that it was 
intended to prohibit cruel punishments,” but turning to case law to determine the meaning of 
cruelty), with id. at 376–78 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (concluding that the historical record 
demonstrates that the Founders were only concerned with tortuous punishments). 
3  See, e.g., Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 981–85; Weems, 217 U.S. at 389–97 (White, J., 
dissenting); Schwartz, supra note 1, at 378–82. 
4  See, e.g., Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 977–81; Weems, 217 U.S. at 389–90, 404 (White, J., 
dissenting).   
5  Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35, 97 (2008) (Thomas, J., concurring) (using a history of 
changes in how death sentences were carried out in order to advocate for a narrow 
interpretation of the Eighth Amendment’s protections); Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 268 (referring 
to the “vicious punishments” occurring at the time of the English Bill of Rights as including 
“drawing and quartering, burning of women felons, beheading, disemboweling, etc.” and as 
being “common”); Weems, 217 U.S. at 390 (defining the punishments addressed by the 
“cruel and unusual” punishments clause of the English Bill of Rights as being “the atrocious, 
sanguinary and inhuman punishments which had been inflicted in the past upon the persons 
of criminals”). 
6  See, e.g., Solem, 463 U.S. at 285–86 (arguing that the English Bill of Rights embraced 
the concept of proportionality present in earlier documents such as the Magna Carta); 
Rummel, 445 U.S. at 289 (Powell, J., dissenting) (same); BESSLER, supra note 1, at 31–65 
(arguing that Enlightenment authors, especially Cesare Beccaria, greatly influenced the 
Founders); Schwartz & Wishingrad, supra note 1, at 784–85 (same). 
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neither approach has convincingly established why such an Amendment 
would be considered important enough to include in the Bill of Rights, 
much less what it was intended to capture. 
The picture that emerges from the Supreme Court’s treatment of the 
history of the Eighth Amendment is that either the penal methods used in 
the past are of little importance, or the only thing worth knowing about 
penal form historically is that it was tortuous and cruel.7  This Article, in 
contrast, demonstrates that penal form and the changes it was undergoing at 
the end of the eighteenth century is highly relevant in interpreting the 
Eighth Amendment.  The attempts at experimentation that occurred during 
this period make clear that the underlying concern leading to the Eighth 
Amendment’s adoption was not horrible past punishments per se, but rather 
the need to adopt punishments in keeping with republican (and as will be 
seen “civilized”) government.8  The precise content of what this meant was 
subject to debate, and yet some key assumptions regarding the desirability 
of reform were largely shared across the lines of contention.9  This history 
has not hitherto been examined in the context of the meaning of the Eighth 
Amendment and it sheds important light on how attempts at penal reform in 
the new republic may have informed understandings of that Amendment. 
The changes that had occurred between seventeenth-century England 
(also known as the Stuart Period of English history) and the American 
Revolution were understood at the time in terms of cultural progress and 
increasing civilization.10  The American republic was seen as a new 
pinnacle along a continuum of progress, but not as the end point of that 
progression.11  Indeed, the various local-level experiments in criminal law 
reform that occurred between the time of the Revolution and the adoption of 
the Bill of Rights suggest that the one thing the Founding Generation could 
be sure of is that they did not know the final form the reform of the criminal 
laws would take.12  Thus, in order to understand the meaning of the Eighth 
 
7  Compare Solem, 463 U.S. at 285–86 (containing no examination of punishments used 
in historical context), with Baze, 553 U.S. at 97 (Thomas, J., concurring) (arguing that the 
Eighth Amendment is only intended to prohibit “tortuous punishments”). 
8  See discussion infra Part II.C. 
9  BERNARD BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 28–29 
(1967) (identifying Cesare Beccaria and his notions of a more enlightened penal practice as 
one of a handful of thinkers embraced by loyalists and patriots alike). 
10  See infra Part II.A and C.  
11  See infra Part II.B. 
12  See infra Part II.D.  Bernard Bailyn argues that the important experiments with 
republican ideology at the local level prior to the Constitution and Bill of Rights mark the 
second phase of the ideological development of the American Revolution. The various 
attempts at criminal law reform that occurred within the states traced in Part II, infra, can 
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Amendment, it is not enough to acknowledge changes that had already 
occurred at the time of the Revolution or the adoption of the Bill of Rights, 
rather it is necessary to understand the place of these changes within a 
larger narrative of what the American republic was understood by the 
Founding Generation to be achieving at its creation. 
By focusing narrowly on the specific words of the Eighth Amendment, 
the Court’s historical inquiry has tended to treat particular penal methods in 
a rather static way—as though the only distinction that can be drawn is 
between the so-called “Stuart horrors” of the seventeenth century and 
eighteenth-century penal practice.13 In contrast, various scholars have 
argued that the shift in penal policy during this period was both gradual and 
wide-ranging, and, in the words of Louis Masur “embodied the triumph of 
new sensibilities and the reconstitution of cultural values throughout the 
Western world.”14  The Eighth Amendment was not an end point within this 
far-ranging development, rather it took form at a particular historical 
moment within the arc of a deeper cultural change.15 
This Article departs from previous histories of the Eighth Amendment 
by drawing on the now considerable histories of criminal law and penal 
reform in the late eighteenth century.  These histories are sufficiently 
detailed to permit a “thick description”16 of the debates and concerns 
regarding the criminal law and punishment that occurred at the time the 
Eighth Amendment was drafted and adopted.  At the time of the Eighth 
Amendment’s drafting, vibrant debates were occurring regarding the form 
punishment should take within a civilized society and as an aspect of 
republican governance.17 The history of penal reform outlined in Part II 
 
thus be seen as part of this larger attempt to remake local institutions into a form more fitting 
with the image of the new republic.  At the same time, these local level reforms in turn 
shaped how governance would be structured and thought about in the new republic. BAILYN, 
supra note 9, at vii.  
13  See, e.g., Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35, 94, 97 (2008) (Thomas, J., concurring) (arguing 
that “[t]he Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on the ‘inflict[ion]’ of ‘cruel and unusual 
punishments’ must be understood in light of the historical practices that led the Framers to 
include it in the Bill of Rights” and concluding that “the Eighth Amendment was intended to 
disable Congress from imposing tortuous punishments”).  
14  LUIS P. MASUR, RITES OF EXECUTION: CAPITAL PUNISHMENT AND THE 
TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN CULTURE, 1776–1865, at 3 (1991). 
15  See infra Part II.D.   
16  To perform a “thick description” is to “engage with the frameworks of meaning 
within which social action takes place.” DAVID GARLAND, PUNISHMENT AND MODERN 
SOCIETY: A STUDY IN SOCIAL THEORY 193 (1990).  The term is best elucidated by CLIFFORD 
GEERTZ, Thick Description: Toward an Interpretive Theory of Culture, in THE 
INTERPRETATION OF CULTURES 3 (1973).   
17  See discussion infra Part II.   
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demonstrates that the Eighth Amendment must be understood to prohibit 
more than a narrowly defined group of outdated penalties.  Rather, it 
captures an understanding about the fact and process of historical change.18 
This paper goes beyond a history of the ideas that help us understand 
the fact and process of penal reform, however.  At the time the Eighth 
Amendment was adopted, there was a shift occurring in individual 
sensibilities with regard to interpersonal violence and the site of physical 
infliction of pain.19 The impact of this “way of feeling,” which is both 
socially and historically determined, can be seen in Justice Scalia’s 
admission that there is a limit to originalism when it comes to the Eighth 
Amendment.20  While arguing for an originalist approach to constitutional 
interpretation, Scalia conceded that although whipping would not have been 
constitutionally suspect in 1791, he would have difficulty “upholding a 
 
18  Although I am not myself an originalist, this does not mean that the argument here is 
irrelevant to its adherents.  My argument is most akin to that advanced by Paul Freund when 
he asserted with regard to habeas corpus that “there is involved in such institutions or 
practices a dynamic element which itself was adopted by the framers. . . . The organic 
element in an institution ought to be taken into account . . . .”  Paul A. Freund, Discussion of 
William Hurst, The Role of History, in SUPREME COURT AND SUPREME LAW 59, 61 (Edmond 
Cahn ed., 1954).  Attempting to understand the meaning of cruel and unusual by focusing on 
those practices that would meet that definition in 1791 misses the larger import of the phrase 
which, I argue, was meant to capture the dynamism of penal reform in the late-eighteenth 
century. 
19  J.M. BEATTIE, CRIME AND THE COURTS IN ENGLAND 1660–1800, at 111–12 (1986) 
(finding a reduction in prosecutions for murder and manslaughter in Surrey, England 
between 1660–1800, and arguing that this indicates “a developing civility, expressed perhaps 
in a more highly developed politeness of manner and a concern not to offend or to take 
offense, and an enlarged sensitivity toward some forms of cruelty and pain”); PIETER 
SPIERENBURG, THE SPECTACLE OF SUFFERING: EXECUTIONS AND THE EVOLUTION OF 
REPRESSION: FROM A PREINDUSTRIAL METROPOLIS TO THE EUROPEAN EXPERIENCE 200–01 
(2008) (arguing that changes in the form of executions throughout Europe indicate a 
“fundamental change in sensibilities which set in after the middle of the eighteenth century” 
and ultimately led to the privatization of executions and narrowing of the capital codes). 
20  David Garland uses “ways of feeling” synonymously with the less popularly well-
known term “sensibilities.”  GARLAND, supra note 16, at 213.  He also uses the terms 
“emotions” and “structures of affect,” all in an attempt to describe “[t]he range and 
refinement of the feelings experienced by individuals, their sensitivities and insensitivities, 
the extent of their emotional capacities, and their characteristic forms of gratification and 
inhibition.”  Id.  He argues that “[t]he question of how sensibilities are structured and how 
they change over time is important . . . because it has a direct bearing upon punishment,” in 
part because “crime and punishment are issues which provoke an emotional response on the 
part of the public and those involved.”  Id.  “[T]o the extent that punishment implies the use 
of violence or the infliction of pain and suffering, its deployment will be affected by the 
ways in which prevailing sensibilities differentiate between permissible and impermissible 
forms of violence, and by cultural attitudes towards the sight of pain.”  Id. at 214. 
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statute that imposes the punishment of flogging.”21  This is a statement that 
relies on a way of feeling that is clearly separate from the Justice’s views of 
how history determines the Eighth Amendment’s application. This 
sensibility has itself been shaped over time.  The history examined in Part II 
thus seeks to explore how the Founding Generation thought about penal 
change and its place within the creation of the American republic on an 
intellectual level, as well as shifts and changes that were occurring at the 
level of emotional responses to physical suffering and argues that both are 
relevant to understanding the original meaning of the phrase “cruel and 
unusual.”  This Article will argue that it was this process of changing 
sensibilities that was embodied in the Eighth Amendment, and that rather 
than ossifying the sensibilities of the late seventeenth century, the 
Amendment captured the belief that sensibilities would and should develop 
and change over time. 
Ultimately, this Article highlights two very different ways of 
determining the meaning of a phrase.  One approach, which is most 
prevalent in the Supreme Court’s decisions, is formalistic, focused narrowly 
on instances in the historical record where the precise words in question 
appear, even while ultimately relying on an interpretation of their 
application at one moment in time.  The other seeks to recreate a world of 
thought, a system of meaning and a way of feeling out of which a particular 
phrase arose.  My intention in this Article is to show that a historical 
approach that seeks to fully engage with the context in which a text is 
created yields insights that other historical approaches neglect.  An entire 
history of thought and meaning surrounded the adoption of the Eighth 
Amendment, but has largely been overlooked in discussions regarding the 
application of that Amendment.22 This history sheds important light on the 
terms of current debates on the Court and in the scholarship over 
application of the Eighth Amendment. 
Moreover, Part III will demonstrate that the history presented in Part II 
is not only a history of the ideas and influences upon the Founding 
Generation, it is also the first step in a history of how penal reform and 
change has been understood throughout the previous two centuries and 
more.  In other words, the history of the intellectual and emotional 
antecedents of the Founders’ thought is a story about our own antecedents 
and continues to inform how the Eighth Amendment is interpreted not 
because of the relatively recent focus on originalism, but because narratives 
of progress, enlightenment, and civilized understanding, along with actual 
 
21 Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CINN. L. REV. 849, 861 (1989). 
22  See discussion infra Part III. 
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changes in sensibilities, have shaped how justices in the nineteenth, 
twentieth, and twenty-first centuries have interpreted the Eighth 
Amendment.23 Understanding this history, separate and apart from the 
history of the Eighth Amendment, is relevant for clarifying some of the 
current debates over the Amendment’s application.  Though this history is 
too complex to provide easy answers to current questions, if American 
jurisprudence is to engage honestly and rigorously with the history of penal 
changes and reform, then the experiments with and discussions regarding 
penal reform that occurred in the American colonies following the 
Revolution, and the continuing impact of the underlying arguments and 
beliefs, cannot continue to be ignored. 
*  *  * 
This Article proceeds in three parts.  Part I summarizes how the history 
of the Eighth Amendment has been told in numerous Supreme Court 
opinions.  Part II then provides a thick description24 of the changes to the 
criminal law and punishment that were occurring in the colonies following 
the American Revolution.  It explores the transformations those practices 
underwent in three key states following the Revolution: Virginia, 
Massachusetts, and Pennsylvania.  The reform movements in each are 
presented as examples of broader cultural, intellectual, and emotional 
changes that spanned not only the colonies but Europe as well.  This Part 
recreates the milieu out of which the Eighth Amendment emerged.  It 
argues that a confluence of various strains of thought, previously 
unexplored in the literature on the Eighth Amendment, created a particular 
attitude towards penal change that can be linked to broader ideas regarding 
civilization and progress, as well as the very specific place of the new 
American republic within that narrative.  Part III then explores some 
implications of this revised history for current debates regarding the 
meaning and application of the Eighth Amendment.  It examines how the 
Supreme Court has relied on the concepts of civilization, progress, and 
proportionality examined in Part II to interpret penal change and how the 
history of those concepts themselves sheds light on their current application 
and meaning. 
I. HISTORY OF THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT AT THE SUPREME COURT 
This Part traces how the history of the Eighth Amendment has been 
debated within Supreme Court cases.  The first section discusses opinions 
 
23  See discussion infra Part III. 
24  See GEERTZ, supra note 16, at 3. 
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that profess to rely on the textual history of the Eighth Amendment.25  This 
approach purports to focus narrowly on discussion in the historical record 
of the clauses’ specific words and tends to yield an interpretation of the 
Eighth Amendment that limits the scope of its protections.  The second 
section examines various approaches to the history of the Eighth 
Amendment that claim to support a more expansive view of the Eighth 
Amendment’s application.  The Supreme Court opinions that embrace this 
approach view the relevant history more broadly than those embracing a 
textualist approach by examining, albeit in a limited way, the context of the 
Eighth Amendment’s adoption.26  However, this approach largely ignores 
questions of penal change, which was a subject of vigorous debate at the 
time of adoption, a debate in which many Founders participated.27  Indeed, 
we will see that in practice both approaches share key assumptions about 
penal form at the time of the adoption of the Bill of Rights.  By failing to 
engage with the broader history of penal change, I conclude, neither 
approach can provide an adequate explanation for how it was that any 
specific punishment came to be seen as cruel and unusual, nor why a 
prohibition against cruel and unusual punishments was important enough to 
include in the Bill of Rights. 
A. THE TEXTUAL APPROACH 
Those justices that take a textualist approach to the Eighth Amendment 
purport to focus on instances in the historical record when the term “cruel 
and unusual” is specifically used.  This takes them back to the origin of the 
wording of the Eighth Amendment in the English Bill of Rights, adopted in 
 
25  Part I.B refers to this approach as the “textualist” approach, borrowing from the 
following definition provided by Justice Scalia: “The theory of originalism treats a 
constitution like a statute, giving the [C]onstitution the meaning that its words were 
understood to bear at the time they were promulgated.  You will sometimes hear it described 
as the theory of original intent.  You will never hear me refer to original intent, because I am 
first of all a textualist, and secondly an originalist.  If you are a textualist, you don’t care 
about the intent, and I don’t care if the Framers of the U.S. Constitution had some secret 
meaning in mind when they adopted its words.  I take the words as they were promulgated to 
the people of the United States, and what is the fairly understood meaning of those words.” 
Justice Antonin Scalia, Speech at Catholic University of America: Judicial Adherence to the 
Text of our Basic Law: A Theory of Constitutional Interpretation (Oct. 18, 1996) (transcript 
available at http://www.proconservative.net/PCVol5Is225ScaliaTheoryConstlInterpretation.
shtml).  
26  For a description of contextualism as an approach to intellectual and legal history, see 
William W. Fisher III, Texts and Contexts: The Application to American Legal History of the 
Methodologies of Intellectual History, 49 STAN. L. REV. 1065, 1068–69, 1076–79 (1997). 
27  See infra Part II passim. 
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1689 following the Glorious Revolution of 1688.28  From there, they 
examine the adoption of the clause in various state bills of rights, 
discussions over the need for a bill of rights in the Constitutional 
Conventions and debate over the Eighth Amendment in the First 
Congress.29  Although this approach claims to limit itself to textual 
references, its basic premise that the meaning of cruel and unusual became 
fixed in 1791 forces the justices using this method to ultimately depend on a 
conception of what punishments were in use in the seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries. For this reason, the relevant history examined by the 
textualists ultimately goes beyond the specific terms used in the 
Amendment, and examines some portion of the intellectual and social 
history of the period.  The opinions of three justices exemplify this 
approach, Justice White, writing in dissent in Weems v. United States30; 
Justice Scalia, whose interpretation of the history of the Eighth Amendment 
is most fully articulated in Harmelin v. Michigan31; and Justice Thomas, 
whose concurring opinion in Baze v. Rees32 most clearly demonstrates how 
far from the text the justices taking this approach have ultimately strayed.33 
Before we examine these opinions, however, it is necessary to set out 
some of their background.  A focus on what punishments would have been 
considered cruel in the eighteenth century originated long before the more 
recent debates over history and constitutional interpretation.  Graphic 
descriptions of past punishments created a baseline against which 
contemporary penal measures were compared in the few nineteenth-century 
 
28  Anthony F. Granucci, “Nor Cruel and Unusual Punishments Inflicted:” The Original 
Meaning, 57 CAL. L. REV. 839, 852–53 (1969).  The relevant wording is: “That excessive 
baile ought not to be required nor excessive fines imposed nor cruell and unusuall 
punishments inflicted.” The Bill of Rights, 1 Will. & Mar. sess. 2, c. 2. (1688); see also 
Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 969 (1991) (quoting more extensively from the English 
Bill of Rights, including the preamble listing the harms the Bill of Rights was drafted to 
address). 
29  See Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35, 97–99 (2008) (Thomas, J., concurring); Harmelin v. 
Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 975–85 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring); Weems v. United States, 
217 U.S. 349, 394–98 (1910) (White, J., dissenting). 
30  217 U.S. at 382–413.  
31  501 U.S. at 966–75. 
32  553 U.S. at 94–107. 
33  While I focus here on how these opinions have a narrow view of penal form at the 
time of the adoption of the Bill of Rights, John Stinneford argues that they also have an 
overly simplified approach to the terms “cruel” and “unusual,” respectively.  See generally 
John Stinneford, The Original Meaning of “Cruel,” 105 GEO. L.J. 441; John Stinneford, The 
Original Meaning of “Unusual”: The Eighth Amendment as a Bar to Cruel Innovation, 102 
NW. U. L. REV. 1739 (2008).  The approach taken here differs in arguing that the meaning of 
the phrase “cruel and unusual” can be more fully understood if it is read against the 
background of debates and discussions over penal reform in the new republic.   
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opinions that considered the meaning of the Eighth Amendment.34  For 
example, Wilkerson v. Utah35 involved a question over the constitutionality 
of a method of punishment (firing squad).36  In its opinion, the Court 
referenced the methods of execution discussed by Blackstone37 and 
concluded: 
[Blackstone] admits that in very atrocious crimes other circumstances of terror, pain, 
or disgrace were sometimes superadded.  Cases mentioned by the author are, where 
the prisoner was drawn or dragged to the pace of execution, in treason; or where he 
was emboweled alive, beheaded, and quartered, in high treason.  Mention is also made 
of public dissection in murder, and burning alive in treason committed by a female.38 
From this description of previously available punishments, the Court 
derived the principle that “it is safe to affirm that punishments of torture, 
such as those mentioned by the commentator referred to, and all others in 
the same line of unnecessary cruelty, are forbidden by that amendment to 
the Constitution.”39 
 
34   O’Neil v. State of Vermont, 144 U.S. 323, 339 (1892) (Fields, J., dissenting); In re 
Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436, 446 (1890); Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130, 135 (1878). Numerous 
state court decisions similarly found “cruel and unusual” provisions in state law to only 
apply to “a punishment that disgraced the civilization of former ages and made one shudder 
with horror to read of it.”  LARRY CHARLES BERKSON, THE CONCEPT OF CRUEL AND UNUSUAL 
PUNISHMENT 9 (1975) (citing People v. Morris, 80 Mich. 634, 637 (1890); Whitten v. State, 
47 Ga. 297, 301 (1872); State v. Manuel, 20 N.C. 20, 36 (1838)). The graphicness of their 
descriptions evokes the work of Karen Halttunen, who argued that over the course of the 
nineteenth century, murder narratives in popular fiction increasingly contained “deliberate 
use of pain and horror to generate readers’ pleasure, the peculiar ‘dreadful pleasure’ of 
imaginatively viewing terrible scenes of violent death.” KAREN HALTTUNEN, MURDER MOST 
FOUL: THE KILLER AND THE AMERICAN GOTHIC IMAGINATION 61 (1998).  She argues that this 
was a result of a “revolution in sensibility we may call humanitarian, which in shaping 
dramatically new responses to pain and death gave rise to a pornography of violence that 
both fed a new taste for body-horror, and confirmed the guilt attached to that taste.”  Id. at 
62.  This “revolution in sensibility” is discussed infra Part II.A and C.  For our purposes, the 
significance of Halttunen’s point is simply that because public infliction of pain was no 
longer acceptable (for example, public executions were almost entirely abolished by the mid-
nineteenth century), the graphic descriptions of past punishments were used in these 
opinions as a means of reveling in past horror, while emphasizing the restraint of modern 
sensibilities that reject such practices. 
35  99 U.S. 130 (1878). 
36  Id. at 130. 
37  4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 370–71 (1979). 
(“Disgusting as this catalogue may seem, it will afford pleasure to an English reader, and do 
honour to the English law, to compare it with that shocking apparatus of death and torment, 
to be met with in criminal codes of almost every other nation in Europe.”). 
38  Wilkerson, 99 U.S. at 135. The opinion also cites Archbold’s treatise for examples “of 
such legislation in the early history of the parent country,” though specific examples are not 
cited. Id. 
39  Id. at 135–36. 
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The Court in In re Kemmler,40 which concerned the constitutionality of 
electrocution as a method of execution, continued in this vein, pointing to 
punishments that “were manifestly cruel and unusual, [such] as burning at 
the stake, crucifixion, breaking on the wheel, or the like.”41  The 
consequences of focusing on these outmoded forms of punishment are 
made clear by the Court’s conclusion that “[p]unishments are cruel when 
they involve torture or a lingering death. . . . It implies there something 
inhuman and barbarous, something more than the mere extinguishment of 
life.”42  While debate over the history of the Eighth Amendment expanded 
during the twentieth and twenty-first centuries, this tendency to reduce 
understanding of past punishments to graphic lists of extreme penalties 
continues to influence understanding of the meaning “cruel and unusual.” 
The first justice to support a narrow interpretation using the Eighth 
Amendment’s own history, rather than a limited history of penal form, was 
Justice White who dissented in Weems.43  The majority held that the 
punishment in question44 was disproportionate to the offense and therefore 
in violation of the “cruel and unusual punishments” clause.45  Justice White, 
in contrast, focused on the history of the Eighth Amendment to argue that it 
 
40  136 U.S. 436 (1890). 
41  Id. at 446. 
42  Id. at 447. 
43  217 U.S. 349, 382–413 (1910) (White, J., dissenting) (rejecting a reading of the 
Eighth Amendment that would embrace the concept of proportionality and instead limiting 
his interpretation of that Amendment’s application to punishments that were considered 
cruel and unusual in 1689 when the English Bill of Rights was adopted).  
44  Weems was an employee of the United States government in the Philippines and was 
accused of falsifying official documents, namely by “entering as paid out, ‘as wages of 
employees of the Light House Service of the United States Government of the Philippine 
Islands,’ at the Capul Light House, of 208 pesos, and for like service at the Matabriga Light 
House of 408 pesos, Philippine currency.” Id. at 357–58.  For this offense, Weems was 
sentenced “‘[t]o the penalty of fifteen years of Cadena, together with the accessories of 
section 56 of the Penal Code, and to pay a fine of four thousand pesetas, but not to serve 
imprisonment as a subsidiary punishment in case of his insolvency, on account of the nature 
of the main penalty, and to pay the costs of this cause.’” Id. at 358.  “[T]hose sentenced to 
cadena temporal and cadena perpetua shall labor for the benefit of the state. They shall 
always carry a chain at the ankle, hanging from the wrists; they shall be employed at hard 
and painful labor, and shall receive no assistance whatsoever from without the institution.” 
Id. at 364. Also included were certain civil penalties, including permanent disqualification 
from public office and “subjection to surveillance” of the public authorities for life.  Id.  
Weems challenged his conviction on numerous grounds, including an allegation that his 
sentence violated a provision of the American government’s treaty with the Philippines 
Islands, which was identical to the Eighth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution.  Id. at 367–
68. 
45  Id. at 380–81.   
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did not include a proportionality principle.46  He made this argument by 
tracing the wording of the Eighth Amendment back to a nearly identical 
provision in the English Bill of Rights of 1689.47  The full contours of 
Justice White’s analysis of the history of the “cruel and unusual clause” in 
the English Bill of Rights are not directly relevant; what is of interest is his 
definition of cruel and unusual punishments within the meaning of that 
document.48  Justice White argued that the meaning of the Eighth 
Amendment was limited to the meaning of the same phrase in the English 
Bill of Rights.49  According to Justice White, the term “cruel” in the English 
Bill of Rights referred to punishments that “were the atrocious, sanguinary, 
and inhuman punishments which had been inflicted in the past upon the 
persons of criminals.”50  These punishments were “such as disgraced the 
civilization of former ages, and made one shudder with horror to read of 
them, as drawing, quartering, burning, etc.”51  While seventeenth-century 
English punishments would make “one shudder with horror,” Justice White 
went on to remark that, during the period between the adoption of the 
English Bill of Rights and the American Revolution, “‘[t]he severity of the 
criminal law [in England] was greatly increased . . . [and] there can be no 
doubt that the legislation of the eighteenth century in criminal matters was 
severe to the highest degree, and destitute of any sort of principle or 
system.’”52  This account thus portrays English penal practice as going from 
bad to worse.  However, Justice White goes on to argue that in America, 
this type of punishment had largely become irrelevant by the time the 
American Bill of Rights was adopted because by then, “as a rule, the cruel 
 
46  Id. at 389–99. 
47  Id. at 389–96. 
48  Id. at 406. Debate over the meaning and relevance of the related provision in the 
English Bill of Rights has been extensive; see, e.g., AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: 
CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION 279 (1998); IRVING BRANT, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: ITS 
ORIGIN AND MEANING 134–58 (1965); LEONARD W. LEVY, ORIGINS OF THE BILL OF RIGHTS 
231–37 (1999); ROBERT ALLEN RUTLAND, THE BIRTH OF THE BILL OF RIGHTS, 1776–1791 at 
1–6, 9 (1955); BERNARD SCHWARTZ, THE GREAT RIGHTS OF MANKIND: A HISTORY OF THE 
AMERICAN BILL OF RIGHTS 21–23 (1977); Granucci, supra note 28, at 852–60; Schwartz, 
supra note 1, at 378–82.  
49  Weems, 217 U.S. at 394–95.  
50  Id. at 390.   
51  Id. at 404; see also id. at 409 (discussing how “the word cruel, as used in the 
Amendment, forbids . . . [the infliction of] unnecessary bodily suffering through a resort to 
inhuman methods for causing bodily torture, like or which are of the nature of the cruel 
methods of bodily torture which had been made use of prior to the bill of Rights of 1689”). 
52  Id. at 393 (quoting 1 JAMES FITZJAMES STEPHEN, HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF 
ENGLAND 470–71 (1883)).  
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bodily punishments of former times were no longer imposed.”53  We will 
see in Part II that this portrayal of past punishments relies upon a caricature 
of the past, as containing punishments that were simultaneously cruel and 
torturous while also largely disappearing from the American colonies in the 
eighteenth century. Justice White’s argument in Weems, lacks a deep 
analysis of the relevant historical context and the changes they did or did 
not undergo in the intervening century. Instead, while purporting to trace 
the text and its meaning, this account ultimately relies on expressions of 
“horror” and short lists of extreme punishments. 
While Justice White used the Eighth Amendment’s origin in the 
English Bill of Rights to justify a narrow interpretation that limited the 
Amendment’s protections to the types of cruel bodily punishments imposed 
in England at the time, Justice Scalia ultimately argued that this history is 
largely irrelevant because what mattered was what the drafters of the Bill of 
Rights thought the words meant.54 He focused on statements and events in 
late eighteenth-century America to distill the meaning of “cruel and unusual 
punishments.”55  He started by examining the wording of the clause itself, 
which does not mention proportionality, even though certain state 
constitutions did explicitly require proportionality in punishments.56  Here, 
Justice Scalia engaged in a classic form of statutory construction: pointing 
to similar earlier documents that do use the term in order to demonstrate 
that the drafters of the text in question did not intend to include said term.57  
Next, Justice Scalia pointed to what he termed “contemporary 
understanding,” which he found in the statements made during the 
constitutional conventions, the debate over the Bill of Rights in the First 
Congress, the actions of the First Congress and early commentary on the 
clause, and nineteenth-century court decisions interpreting this or similar 
state provisions.58 
 
53  Id. at 395. He also stated that “judges, where moderate, bodily punishment was usual, 
had not, under the guise of discretion, directed the infliction of such punishments to so 
unusual a degree as to transcend the limits of discretion and cause the punishment to be 
illegal.” Id. 
54  Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 966–75 (1991).  
55  Id. at 977–81.  
56  Id. at 977–79 (Justice Scalia cites the following state constitutional provisions 
adopted before the Bill of Rights: N.H. BILL OF RIGHTS of 1784, art. XVIII (“[A]ll penalties 
ought to be proportioned to the nature of the offence.”); S.C. CONST. of 1778, art. XL 
(“punishments should be in general more proportionate to the crimes”); PA. CONST. of 1776, 
§ 38 (same).). Justice Scalia’s historical approach in this opinion is focused on rejecting any 
notion of proportionality. This concept will be explored in more detail in the next part. 
57  See id. at 977–81. 
58  Id. at 978–85.  
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Turning first to the constitutional conventions, the question of a 
protection against cruel and unusual punishments only arose twice.59  
During the Massachusetts Convention, Mr. Holmes argued that without a 
Bill of Rights, Congress was nowhere restrained from imposing “the most 
cruel and unheard-of punishments . . . and there is no constitutional check 
on them, but that racks and gibbets may be amongst the most mild 
instruments of their discipline.”60 During the Virginia Convention, Patrick 
Henry made an impassioned plea that a Bill of Rights was required to 
prevent Congress from permitting torture.61  From these statements, Justice 
Scalia concluded that the drafters of the Eighth Amendment were narrowly 
focused on methods of punishment and the only methods they found to be 
cruel and unusual were those akin to torture.62 
Next, Justice Scalia turned to the actions of the First Congress, which 
“punished forgery of United States securities, ‘run[ning] away with [a] ship 
or vessel, or any goods or merchandise to the value of fifty dollars,’ treason, 
and murder on the high seas with the same penalty: death by hanging.”63  
 
59  See id. at 977–80. 
60  2 JONATHAN ELLIOT, THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE 
ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 111 (2d ed. 1901).   
61  3 JONATHAN ELLIOT, THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE 
ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 445–48 (2d ed. 1901).   
62  Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 979–83. This argument that the drafters were concerned only 
with methods of punishment was first made by Anthony Granucci in an influential article on 
the Eighth Amendment. Granucci, supra note 28, at 842–47. Although the heart of his article 
focused on the meaning of the same provision in the English Bill of Rights, he first argued 
that the Founders were concerned about preventing certain methods of punishment and that 
in so doing they actually misunderstood the true meaning of the English Bill of Rights.  Id. 
Granucci has been cited in eight Supreme Court cases: Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 968, 973 n.4, 
974–75 n.5, 979; Id. at 1011 n.1 (White, J., dissenting); Browning-Ferris Indus. of Vermont, 
Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 289, 294 (1989) (O’Connor, J., concurring in part 
and dissenting in part); Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 312 n.5 (1983) (Burger, C.J., 
dissenting); Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 287, 289 (1980) (Powell, J., dissenting); 
Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 664 n.29, n.31 (1977); Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 
102 (1976); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 169 (1976); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 
274 (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring); Id. at 242 n.2 (Douglas, J., concurring); Id. at 316 n.5, 
318–19 n.11, n.13–15 (Marshall, J., concurring); Id. at 376 n.2 (Burger, C.J., dissenting); Id. 
at 419 n.3 (Powell, J., dissenting). This line of argumentation has not gone unanswered.  The 
fullest response came in Justice Brennan’s opinion in Furman, which concluded that:  
It does not follow, however, that the Framers were exclusively concerned with prohibiting 
torturous punishments. Holmes and Henry were objecting to the absence of a Bill of Rights, and 
they cited to support their objections the unrestrained legislative power to prescribe punishments 
for crimes. Certainly we may suppose that they invoked the specter of the most drastic 
punishments a legislature might devise. 
Furman, 408 U.S. at 260 (Brennan, J., concurring).  
63  Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 980–81 (quoting 1 Stat. 114 (1790)). 
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Justice Scalia contrasted the federal punishments with two contemporary 
documents that pointed to an alternative approach.64  The first was the New 
Hampshire Constitution, which required proportionality in punishments and 
defined proportionality in a limited way: “‘[n]o wise legislature’—that is, 
no legislature attuned to the principle of proportionality—‘will affix the 
same punishment to the crimes of theft, forgery and the like, which they do 
to those of murder and treason.’”65  He also pointed to Thomas Jefferson’s 
Bill For Proportioning Crimes and Punishments, which “punished murder 
and treason by death; counterfeiting of public securities by forfeiture of 
property plus six years at hard labor, and ‘run[ning] away with any sea-
vessel or goods laden on board thereof’ by treble damages to the victim and 
five years at hard labor.”66  Because the legislation passed by the First 
Congress did not similarly explicitly embrace proportionality, and instead 
relied upon the death penalty as a punishment for a range of offenses, 
Justice Scalia concluded that the Founders did not interpret the Eighth 
Amendment to include a requirement of proportionality.67  Missing from 
this analysis is any of the contemporary discussions regarding the need for 
penal reform (which was widely accepted) and the various attempts that 
were being made at this time to devise revised criminal codes that would 
allow for more republican or civilized modes of punishing.68  Jefferson’s 
bill was rejected by the Virginia legislature and, as will be seen in Part II, 
although there were various state level experiments with hard labor 
occurring at this time, none were advanced enough to serve as a model for 
the newly formed federal government.69 
Justice Scalia also cited two nineteenth-century commentators whose 
arguments as to what constitutes cruel punishments resemble those found in 
the nineteenth-century cases: “the rack or the stake, or any of those horrid 
modes of torture, devised by human ingenuity for the gratification of 
fiendish passion” and “[t]he various barbarous and cruel punishments 
inflicted under the laws of some other countries. . . . Breaking on the wheel, 
flaying alive, rending assunder with horses, various species of horrible 
tortures inflicted in the inquisition, maiming, mutilating and scourging to 
death.”70  Thus, even while Justice Scalia’s opinion attempted to rest upon 
 
64  Id. at 980. 
65  Id. (quoting N.H. CONST., pt. I, art. XVIII (1784)). 
66  Id. (quoting 1 THOMAS JEFFERSON, THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 220–22, 
229–31 (Albert Ellery Bergh eds., 1905)). This bill is discussed infra Part II.A. 
67  Id. at 980–81.  
68  See infra Part II.   
69  See infra Part II. 
70  Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 981 (quoting JAMES BAYARD, A BRIEF EXPOSITION OF THE 
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purely textual analysis, there is interspersed within it discussion of penal 
form in the early American republic (though focused entirely on the First 
Congress with no examination of state-level experiments) and of 
punishments centered around racks, gibbets, maiming, mutilation, and 
torture.71  His textual analysis thus demonstrates the limits of that approach, 
requiring as it does some attention to the surrounding society and the beliefs 
and understandings that were common at the time.  Once one turns to 
society to understand penal form, however, it is not clear what principle 
limits the examination to penal form, rather than expanding the inquiry to 
embrace penal reform, including why and how it is occurring. 
The opinion that most openly embraces this approach’s reliance upon 
conceptions of past penal practices is Justice Thomas’s concurrence in 
Baze, which like Justice White in Weems, and Justice Scalia in Harmelin, 
provides a very narrow reading of the Eighth Amendment’s protections.72  
Baze involved a challenge to Kentucky’s use of lethal injection.73  Justice 
Thomas began his historical analysis by arguing that the “cruel and 
unusual” punishments clause of the Eighth Amendment “must be 
understood in light of the historical practices that led the Framers to include 
it in the Bill of Rights.”74  The “historical practices” that he examined, 
however, all focus on changes in the implementation of the death penalty.75  
He argued that while death by hanging was the most common form of 
execution, there were additional “tools” used to “‘intensify[] a death 
sentence.’”76 He then cited examples, including burning at the stake, 
“‘gibbeting,’ or hanging the condemned in an iron cage so that his body 
would decompose in public view,” public dissection and “the worst fate a 
criminal could meet . . . ‘embowelling alive, beheading, and quartering.’”77  
He then emphasized the content of this last punishment by quoting a death 
sentence imposed on seven men convicted of high treason (no date is 
given): 
 
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 154 (2d ed. 1840) (referring to “improved spirit of the 
age,” which led to adoption of Eighth Amendment) and BENJAMIN L. OLIVER, THE RIGHTS OF 
AN AMERICAN CITIZEN 186 (1832) (stating that “some other countries” in question “profess 
not to be behind the most enlightened nations on earth in civilization and refinement”)). 
71  Id.  
72  553 U.S. 35, 94–97 (2008) (Thomas, J., concurring).  
73  Id. at 41.  
74  Id. at 94. 
75  Id. at 95–96. 
76  Id. at 95 (quoting STUART BANNER, THE DEATH PENALTY: AN AMERICAN HISTORY 54 
(2002)). 
77  Id. at 95–96 (quoting BANNER, supra note 76, at 72–74; BLACKSTONE, supra note 37, 
at 376). 
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That you and each of you, be taken to the place from whence you came, and from 
thence be drawn on a hurdle to the place of execution, where you shall be hanged by 
the necks, not till you are dead; that you be severally taken down, while yet alive, and 
your bowels be taken out and burnt before your faces—that your heads be then cut 
off, and your bodies cut in four quarters, to be at the King’s disposal. And God 
Almighty have mercy on your souls.78 
Justice Thomas proceeded to argue that these forms of aggravated capital 
punishment had “‘dwindled away’” by the late eighteenth century and 
therefore would have qualified as “unusual” at the time the Eighth 
Amendment was adopted.79  He therefore used this graphic description of a 
punishment that would have been “unusual” in 1789 to support the 
conclusion that the Eighth Amendment was intended to capture only 
“tortuous punishment.”80  Absent is any discussion of the use of these 
penalties in the American colonies or any examination of broader changes 
penal practices in the colonies may have undergone. 
Thus, while Justice Thomas’s decision in Baze differs from the 
examples we saw in Justice White’s opinion in Weems, or Justice Scalia’s 
opinion in Harmelin in that he provided some contextual examination of 
penal practices in England and, to a lesser extent, in the colonies, his 
opinion ultimately rests upon a conception of past penal practices that 
focuses entirely on graphic descriptions of their violence.  By limiting his 
examination to the changes in execution form that occurred between 
seventeenth-century England and late eighteenth-century America, Justice 
Thomas’s opinion in Baze, arrives at a very narrow conception of penal 
 
78  Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35, 96 (2008) (quoting GEORGE R. SCOTT, THE HISTORY OF 
CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 179 (1950)). 
79  Id. at 97 (citing STUART BANNER, THE DEATH PENALTY: AN AMERICAN HISTORY 70 
(2012)).  
80  Id. Although not directly relevant to the history of the Eighth Amendment, some 
justices have sought to argue the irrelevance of this history that relies on histories of 
previous types of punishment to define the meaning of cruel and unusual.  Justice Brennan in 
Furman points to earlier cases that “proceeded primarily by ‘looking backwards for 
examples by which to fix the meaning of the clause.’”  Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 
264 (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring) (quoting Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 377 
(1910)). He argued that, “[h]ad this ‘historical’ interpretation of the Cruel and Unusual 
Punishments Clause prevailed, the Clause would have been effectively read out of the Bill of 
Rights,” and cites to examples of this happening. Id. He begins first with Justice Story, who 
concludes “that the provision ‘would seem to be wholly unnecessary in a free government, 
since it is scarcely possible that any department of such a government should authorize or 
justify such atrocious conduct,’” and then Justice Cooley, who said “the Court, ‘apparently 
in a struggle between the effect to be given to ancient examples and the inconsequence of a 
dread of them in these enlightened times, . . . hesitate[d] to advance definite views.’”  Id. at 
265 (internal citations omitted).  
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change, both what it entailed and how it occurred.81 
B. THE CONTEXTUAL APPROACH 
While the textualists rely on a limited examination of past punishments 
in order to support their narrow interpretation of the Eighth Amendment’s 
protections, the contextualists seemingly grant this portrayal of past 
punishments even while arguing that other aspects of colonial society 
suggest a broader reading of the Eighth Amendment.  The first case to 
suggest looking beyond a narrow focus on the types of punishments used in 
1789 to determine the meaning of the phrase “cruel and unusual” was 
Justice Field, dissenting in O’Neil v. State of Vermont.82  He gestured 
towards this narrower line of interpretation before arguing that the Eighth 
Amendment’s application was not limited to such penalties.83  He argued 
“[t]hat designation [cruel and unusual], it is true, is usually applied to 
punishments which inflict torture, such as the rack, the thumbscrew, the 
iron boot, the stretching of limbs and the like, which are attended with acute 
pain and suffering.”84  However, while “[s]uch punishments were at one 
time inflicted in England,” their use ceased with the adoption of the English 
Bill of Rights.85  Justice Field went on to conclude that “[t]he inhibition is 
directed, not only against punishments of the character mentioned, but 
against all punishments which by their excessive length or severity are 
greatly disproportioned to the offences charged.”86  In other words, “[t]he 
whole inhibition is against that which is excessive either in the bail 
 
81  Justice Thomas’s argument also resembles the argument of Michel Foucault in the 
way it focuses on a dichotomy between modern and pre-modern penalties. See generally 
MICHAEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH: THE BIRTH OF THE PRISON (Alan Sheridan 
trans., 1977). DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH begins and is in many respects shaped by a similar 
dichotomous portrayal of penal form.  The work opens with a graphic description of the 
drawing and quartering by French authorities of a would-be regicide. Id. at 3–6.  Foucault 
then contrasts this penalty with the highly regimented (disciplinary) approach taken by 
penitentiaries in the early nineteenth century.  Id. at 6–7.  Foucault has been critiqued for this 
periodization, with numerous scholars arguing that penal change occurred earlier than 
Foucault suggests and that the process of change was more gradual and less distinct than he 
is willing to admit. GARLAND, supra note 16, at 157–62. Justice Thomas is thus 
constitutionalizing a dichotomous approach to penal form (modern/pre-modern; 
physical/disciplinary) that was suggested by Foucault but that has been closely questioned by 
later historians. 
82  144 U.S. 323, 337–66 (1892). 
83  Id. at 339–40. 
84  Id. at 339. 
85  Id. 
86  Id. at 339–40. 
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required, or fine imposed, or punishment inflicted.”87  Justice Field thus 
expanded the scope of the Eighth Amendment by turning both to the idea of 
penal change, as well as to the concept of proportionality. 
Similarly, although Justice White’s dissent in Weems invoked its 
origin in the English Bill of Rights to narrowly interpret the Eighth 
Amendment, Justice McKenna’s majority opinion in the same case 
examined that history, but then broadened the inquiry to consider from what 
types of abuse those who advocated the Eighth Amendment sought to 
provide protections.  He concluded: 
[S]urely they intended more than to register a fear of the forms of abuse that went out 
of practice with the Stuarts.  Surely, their jealousy of power had a saner justification 
than that. They were men of action, practical and sagacious, not beset with vain 
imagining, and it must have come to them that there could be exercises of cruelty by 
laws other than those which inflict bodily pain or mutilation. . . . [I]t was believed that 
power might be tempted to cruelty. This was the motive of the clause, and if we are to 
attribute an intelligent providence to its advocates we cannot think that it was intended 
to prohibit only practices like the Stuarts, or to prevent only an exact repetition of 
history. We cannot think that the possibility of a coercive cruelty being exercised 
through other forms of punishment was overlooked.88 
Thus, while Justice McKenna acknowledged a history of penal practice that 
contained “exercises of cruelty” and “bodily pain or mutilation,” he invoked 
a conception of the Founders as “men of action, practical and sagacious” to 
argue that they must have intended the Amendment to encompass 
punishments beyond those attributed to the Stuarts.89  At the same time, he 
provides little historical evidence or analysis to support his understanding. 
Justice Douglas’s concurrence in Furman also considered the concerns 
that likely dominated the Framers’ thoughts in determining the scope of the 
Eighth Amendment.90  He also traced the Amendment’s origin to the 
English Bill of Rights and argued that the document “was concerned 
primarily with selective or irregular application of harsh penalties and that 
its aim was to forbid arbitrary and discriminatory penalties of a severe 
nature.”91 Similarly, he pointed to abuses of power that were perpetrated 
during the years immediately prior to the adoption of the English Bill of 
Rights.92  From this history, Justice Douglas argued for an interpretation of 
 
87  Id. at 340. 
88  Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 372–73 (1910). Justice McKenna later stated: 
“[A] principle to be vital must be capable of wider application than the mischief which gave 
it birth.” Id. at 373. 
89  Id. at 372–73. 
90  Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 255 (1972) (Douglas, J., concurring). 
91  Id. at 242. 
92  Id. at 246–57. He uses Irving Brant’s The Bill of Rights, its account of the Bloody 
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the Eighth Amendment that would prohibit discriminatory applications of 
punishments: 
Those who wrote the Eighth Amendment knew what price their forebears had paid for 
a system based, not on equal justice, but on discrimination.  In those days the target 
was not the blacks or the poor, but the dissenters, those who opposed absolutism in 
government, who struggled for a parliamentary regime, and who opposed 
governments’ recurring efforts to foist a particular religion on the people. . . . One 
cannot read this history without realizing that the desire for equality was reflected in 
the ban against “cruel and unusual punishments” contained in the Eighth 
Amendment.93 
Justice Douglas’s opinion, thus focuses on aspects of the historical record 
that illuminate who was targeted by particular punishments, though he gives 
no attention or analysis to what those punishments were. 
Justice Powell’s majority opinion in Solem v. Helm94 is another 
example of this attempt to use a broader history of the Amendment’s origin 
to justify a more expansive interpretation of its application.95  In Solem, 
Justice Powell argued that the English Bill of Rights embraced “[t]he 
principle that a punishment should be proportionate,” a principle that was 
deeply embedded in English constitutional history going back to Magna 
Carta.96  By incorporating the language of the English Bill of Rights, the 
drafters of the Eighth Amendment “also adopted the English principle of 
proportionality” and it was consistently argued that Americans retained “all 
the rights of English subjects.”97  Justice Powell, thus opened the historical 
record to include previous understandings of appropriate punishment in 
England (such as the Magna Carta), along with a broader interpretation of 
what the drafters of the Eighth Amendment thought that they were doing 
when they adopted language directly from the English Bill of Rights.98  
Absent from his opinion, however, was any discussion of past penal 
 
Assizes and the execution of Sidney to support this argument. See BRANT, supra, note 48, at 
154–55. For a similar argument, see Laurence Claus, The Antidiscrimination Eighth 
Amendment, 28 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 119 (2004). 
93  Furman, 408 U.S. at 255. 
94  463 U.S. 277 (1983). 
95  Id. at 284–86. 
96  Id. at 284–85. 
97  Id. at 285–86. 
98  Id. Justice Scalia’s discussion of history in Harmelin was a direct response to Justice 
Powell’s opinion in Solem.  He summarizes Solem’s approach to history this way: “Thus not 
only is the original meaning of the 1689 Declaration of Rights relevant, but also the 
circumstances of its enactment, insofar as they display the particular ‘rights of English 
subjects’ it was designed to vindicate.” Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 966–67 (1991). 
Justice Scalia views the extra-textual aspects of the history presented in Solem as irrelevant. 
Id. at 967.  
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practice and how it may or may not have exhibited a principle of 
proportionality. 
Thus, while there are examples of justices willing to engage in a more 
contextual history of the Eighth Amendment, none of these examples 
engage with the history of punishments in England or America, or the 
changes these punishments underwent in the early years of the republic.  
Rather, they seem to concede the point to the textualists and assume that the 
only thing worth knowing about eighteenth-century penal practice is that it 
was marked by harshness and cruelty.  The next part will demonstrate the 
limitations of this approach.  In order to have a more complete picture of 
how the Founding Generation thought about penal form and its place in the 
American republic, it is necessary to look beyond a narrow list of outmoded 
punishments and examine the entire system of punishments and how they 
were shifting in America during the decade following the Revolution. 
II.  HISTORY OF EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY PENAL CHANGE 
This Part traces the three most significant state-level experiments in 
penal reform that occurred in the decade following the end of the American 
Revolution.  Although debates over reform of the colonial penal system 
began in the years leading up to the Revolution, that event gave new 
impetus and significance to the discussion.99  In the years following the 
Revolution, the colonial penal codes would undergo significant 
transformation.  The examples examined in this Part of these changes are 
significant for a number of reasons.  First, the states involved were leaders 
among the American colonies, as measured by population, economic 
strength and sources of Founding Fathers.  Second, their experiments with 
penal change were most developed, but they were also representative of 
reforms that were occurring elsewhere.  Third, the experiments of each of 
these three states served as examples to other states that later attempted 
similar reforms.  Thus, while focus is on these three states, broader trends, 
practices or experiments elsewhere will be mentioned where relevant. 
The first example is actually a failed attempt at reform: Thomas 
Jefferson’s proposal for a reformed penal code in Virginia.  Although this 
legislation never actually came into effect, debates over some of its more 
 
99  REBECCA MCLENNAN, THE CRISIS OF IMPRISONMENT: PROTEST, POLITICS, AND THE 
MAKING OF THE AMERICAN PENAL STATE, 1776–1941, at 19 (2008). But see ADAM HIRSCH, 
THE RISE OF THE PENITENTIARY: PRISONS AND PUNISHMENT IN EARLY AMERICA 47–56 (1992) 
(arguing that the impact of revolutionary ideology on penal change is more ambiguous than 
this statement suggests and finding the intellectual antecedents for incarceration in the 
workhouse and changes occurring in society to be more directly relevant to shifts in penal 
form that followed the Revolution). 
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controversial provisions capture many of the larger debates over penal 
reform that were occurring in the colonies and in Europe.100  The second 
focuses on Massachusetts and its attempt at implementing incarceration as 
an alternative penalty to either death or public, physical chastisement.  The 
third examines Pennsylvania and its experiment with public hard labor, 
which was quickly abandoned in favor of incarceration.  In each, there was 
vigorous debate over how to reform British penal practice in the new 
republic (even while the need to reform was largely taken for granted) as 
Americans began to “redraw[] the political and moral grounds of possibility 
in the arena of punishment.”101  Moreover, each is representative of 
discussions and changes occurring elsewhere in the world.102  This broader 
context will be examined in each section as relevant in order to situate the 
experiments in penal reform that were occurring in the American colonies 
with intellectual and cultural debates occurring in Europe at that time.  It is 
only by examining this process of actual penal change that we can begin to 
understand how the Founding Generation thought about penal reform and 
how particular punishments might be evaluated as cruel and unusual.  
Examining penal reform in the early republic indicates that the 
determination of what punishments were acceptable was a process 
involving experimentation with new approaches to punishment, rather than 
a fixed state of affairs. 
A. VIRGINIA: THE ENLIGHTENMENT AND DECREASES IN VIOLENCE 
Although the example of Virginia represents a failed attempt at reform, 
the attempt itself and potential reasons for its failure demonstrate the extent 
of the perceived need for reform, the relevance of Enlightenment thinkers 
(especially the work of Cesare Beccaria) in attempts to fashion a new penal 
system, as well as some of the long-term changes in sensibilities regarding 
 
100  Jefferson himself raised concerns regarding these portions of the bill.  Letter from 
Thomas Jefferson to George Wythe (Nov. 1 1778), FOUNDERS ONLINE, http://founders.
archives.gov/documents/Jefferson/01-02-02-0086 (last visited Sept. 4, 2016). Later, 
Jefferson wrote of the bill’s reception in Europe and the concerns raised by the lex talionis 
portions of the bill. Katheryn Preyer, Cesare Beccaria and the Founding Fathers, in 
BLACKSTONE IN AMERICA: SELECTED ESSAYS OF KATHRYN PREYER 69 (Mary Sarah Bilder et 
al., eds. 2009).   
101  Id. at 18. 
102  See, e.g., MICHAEL IGNATIEFF, A JUST MEASURE OF PAIN: THE PENITENTIARY IN THE 
INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION 1750–1850 44–79 (1978) (discussing debates over and changes in 
penal form in England starting in the mid-eighteenth century). See generally PIETER 
SPIERENBERG, THE PRISON EXPERIENCE: DISCIPLINARY INSTITUTIONS AND THEIR INMATES IN 
EARLY MODERN EUROPE (1991) (arguing that there was a long-term gradual shift from public 
physical punishments to imprisonment throughout Europe beginning in the sixteenth 
century). 
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interpersonal and physical violence that impacted how leaders sought to 
shape both society and the government’s response to criminal acts among 
its population.  The proposed reform of the criminal law in Virginia thus 
demonstrates the salience of many of the underlying trends and ways of 
thinking that would impact penal reform elsewhere in the colonies, 
including the push towards reducing capital codes, advocating 
proportionality in sentencing, and increasing discomfort with public, 
physical violence. 
Following the Declaration of Independence in 1776, Virginians 
Thomas Jefferson, George Wythe, and Edmund Pendleton proposed a range 
of revised laws for their state.103  Jefferson was responsible for drafting the 
criminal law portion of these revisions and his resulting, “Bill for 
Proportioning Crimes and Punishments in Cases Heretofore Capital,” was 
completed in 1779.104  However, the legislature delayed considering the bill 
until 1785.105 
The bill embraced a notion of proportionality in punishment and 
declared that each member of society deserved “a punishment in proportion 
to his offence” and protection from any “greater pain, so that it becomes a 
duty in the legislature to arrange in a proper scale the crimes which it may 
be necessary for them to repress, and to adjust thereto a corresponding 
gradation of punishments.”106  It limited the infliction of capital punishment 
by hanging to cases of treason and murder.107 
 
103  Kathryn Preyer, Crime, the Criminal Law and Reform in Post-Revolutionary 
Virginia, 1 LAW & HIST. REV. 53, 56 (1983).  
104  Id. at 56–57. 
105  Id. at 68.  
106  64. A Bill for Proportioning Crimes and Punishments in Cases Heretofore Capital, 
18 June 1779, FOUNDERS ONLINE, http://founders.archives.gov/documents/Jefferson/01-02-
02-0132-0004-0064 (last visited Sept. 4, 2016). The preamble also states various objections 
to capital punishment including: that “reformation of offenders” should be a goal of 
punishment; that “exterminate[ion] . . . of their fellow citizens . . . weakens the state by 
cutting off so many who, if reformed, might be restored sound members to society,” or, 
whose labors while in prison might be useful to or whose example might prove a deterrence 
to other criminals. Id. The bill also argues that “cruel and sanguinary laws defeat their own 
purpose” because people feel reluctant to prosecute or convict knowing the outcome could 
be death. Id. 
107  Id. There was some limited variation in how executions would be carried out 
depending on the type of crime.  While the typical execution form would be hanging, three 
additional penalties of death were proscribed: for petty treason (a servant killing his or her 
master) or murder within a family (husband and wife or parent and child) hanging was to be 
the penalty with dissection following; for cases of murder by poison, death by poison was to 
be the penalty and in cases of dueling, the penalty was to be death by hanging, with the body 
of the challenger gibbeted following death.  Execution was to be swift (the next day, unless 
the next day be Sunday, in which case “on the Monday following”) and both pardons and 
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Hard labor “in the public works” became the penalty for a number of 
formerly capital cases including: manslaughter, counterfeiting, arson, 
willful destruction of ships or their contents, robbery, burglary, 
housebreaking, horse stealing, grand larceny, petty larceny, robbery or 
larceny of bonds, or other obligatory notes, and buying and receiving stolen 
goods.108  Physical punishments remained for a number of offenses, 
however, including: rape, polygamy or sodomy, which were to be punished 
by castration if committed by a man or “if a woman, by cutting thro’ the 
cartilage of her nose a hole of one half inch diameter at the least;” and 
maiming or disfigurement, which would result in the offender being 
“maimed or disfigured in like sort: or if that cannot be for want of the same 
part, then as nearly as may be in some other part of at least equal value and 
estimation in the opinion of a jury.”109 In addition to the above penalties, the 
bill provided for various types of forfeiture of property and or restitution to 
either the victim, the victim’s family, or the Commonwealth.110 
Scholars examining Jefferson and his works have tended to accord 
little importance to this bill, focusing on its reduction in capital crimes and 
deeming its more directly retributive features as “shocking lapses from 
humane and liberal standards” in an overall humanitarian piece of 
legislation.111  There is a tendency to attempt to disaggregate the modern or 
humane aspects of the bill from the backwards-looking “alarming chinks in 
its humanity.”112 This treatment begs the question, however, of which 
aspects are “humane” and which the “shocking lapses.”  In tracing these 
two aspects of the law we can begin to see the transformations that penal 
law in the new republic was soon to undergo. 
Although the bill had numerous influences,113 one of the most 
prominent was Cesare Beccaria.  Beccaria’s Essay on Crimes and 
Punishment was first published in 1764.114  Among the better-known 
 
privilege of clergy were abolished. Id. 
108  Id. 
109  Id.  
110  Id. 
111  MERRILL D. PETERSON, THOMAS JEFFERSON AND THE NEW NATION: A BIOGRAPHY 125 
(1970); Preyer, supra note 103, at 57 n.16. 
112  PETERSON, supra note 111, at 126. 
113  All excellently traced by Kathryn Preyer. See Preyer, supra note 103, at 61–68.  
114  Richard Bellamy, Chronology, in BECCARIA: ON CRIMES AND PUNISHMENTS AND 
OTHER WRITINGS xxxi (Richard Bellamy, ed., Cambridge Texts in the History of Political 
Thought 2000).  Montesquieu also argued for a need to revise criminal laws and asserted that 
“terror and severe punishments are only necessary in ‘despotic government.’ In ‘moderate 
states,’ severe punishment is unnecessary.  ‘Civil laws will make corrections more easily and 
will not need as much force.’” RONALD J. PESTRITTO, FOUNDING THE CRIMINAL LAW: 
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aspects of Beccaria’s work are his calls for strict proportionality in 
punishments,115 their swift application,116 and an end to the death penalty.117 
By the 1770s, this work was widely available in the American colonies.118  
Beccaria was one of a handful of Enlightenment thinkers that everyone, 
loyalist and patriots, could agree on.119  His significance can be seen in part, 
in his ubiquitous presence in the libraries and writings of the Founders.120 
In Jefferson’s bill, one can find numerous instances of Beccaria’s 
influence.  The basic principle it attempts to embrace, that punishments 
should be proportional, is clearly an influence from Beccaria as is its goal to 
reduce the number of crimes that are capital.  Beccaria’s approach can also 
be seen in the call for swift application of punishments and the abolition of 
privilege of clergy and pardons.  At the same time, nothing in Beccaria’s 
work called for such a close approximation between crime and punishment 
as Jefferson’s bill demonstrated in its more retributive, lex talionis, 
provisions, and it was these aspects of the bill that raised concerns at the 
time.  In submitting the bill to George Wythe, Jefferson himself expressed 
the concern that: 
 
PUNISHMENT AND POLITICAL THOUGHT IN THE ORIGINS OF AMERICA 78 (2000). See generally 
David W. Carrithers, Montesquieu’s Philosophy of Punishment, 19(2) HIST. POL. THOUGHT 
213 (1998). 
115  CESARE BECCARIA, ON CRIMES AND PUNISHMENTS AND OTHER WRITINGS 19 (Richard 
Bellamy ed., Richard Davies, trans. 1995) (1764).  
It is in the common interest not only that crimes not be committed, but that they be rarer in 
proportion to the harm they do to society. Hence the obstacles which repel men from committing 
crimes ought to be made stronger the more those crimes are against the public good and the more 
inducements there are for committing them. Hence, there must be proportion between crimes and 
punishments.  
Id. 
116  Id. at 48. “The swifter and closer to the crime a punishment is, the juster and more 
useful it will be.”  
117  Id. at 66–72. 
118  Preyer, supra note 100, at 242.   
119  BAILYN, supra, note 9, at 28–29.   
120  To cite but a few examples: George Washington ordered a copy of his work in 1769, 
as did Jefferson, who copied extensive passages into his Commonplace Book.  Preyer, supra 
note 100, at 241–42; see also BESSLER, supra note 1, at 50.  John Adams quoted from 
Beccaria in his diary in June 1770, and later used that quote in his opening statement in 
defense of the British soldiers in the Boston Massacre Trials.  Preyer, supra note 100, at 242.  
James Wilson and Benjamin Rush, both of Pennsylvania (and both signers of the Declaration 
of Independence and the Constitution) frequently embraced Beccarian arguments.  BESSLER, 
supra note 1, at, 51–53.  Three state constitutions, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, and New 
Hampshire, embraced Beccarian notions of proportionality.  PA. CONST. of 1776, § 38; S.C. 
CONST. of 1778, art. XL; N.H. BILL OF RIGHTS of 1784, art. XVIII. 
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The lex talionis, altho’ a restitution of the Common law, to the simplicity of which we 
have generally found it so advantageous to return will be revolting to the humanised 
feelings of modern times.  An eye for an eye, and a hand for a hand will exhibit 
spectacles in execution whose moral effect would be questionable. . . . This needs 
reconsideration.121 
Writing from France following the Revolution, Jefferson contrasted the 
praise given to Virginia’s Act for Establishing Religious Freedom with the 
criticism the “principle of retaliation” in the proposed revised criminal code 
had received.122 
The “eye for an eye” approach towards crimes involving interpersonal 
violence thus seems out of tune with broader trends towards feelings of 
discomfort with public, physical chastisement.123  One explanation for the 
perceived need for these provisions can perhaps be found in the fact that 
during the eighteenth century in Virginia, there seems to have been a high 
number of assaults, as indicated in the civil records in suits for damages.124  
The Virginia Assembly attempted in 1752, and again in 1772, to impose 
criminal prosecutions in these cases.125  Preyer argues that “[a] high degree 
of individual aggression constituted one of the chief aspects of Virginia 
culture and was shared among all classes of society in much the same 
fashion as gambling, racing, cockfighting or other turbulent 
amusements.”126  Assuming this to be true,127 then the reasons for including 
the lex talionis provisions that appear to be the most anachronistic may in 
fact have a modern bent. 
This interpretation is further supported by the extensive evidence of a 
 
121  Letter from Thomas Jefferson to George Wythe (Nov. 1 1778), FOUNDERS ONLINE, 
http://founders.archives.gov/documents/Jefferson/01-02-02-0086 (last visited Sept. 4, 2016). 
122  Preyer, supra note 100, at 69.  
123  I am setting aside for the moment a debate over whether these were actual feelings 
that were shifting or rather class-based expressions of feeling used to distinguish one group 
(typically described as aristocratic) from another (the common crowd).  Compare V.A.C. 
GATRELL, THE HANGING TREE: EXECUTION AND THE ENGLISH PEOPLE 1770–1868, at 12, 24–
25 (1994), with Randall McGowen, Revisiting the Hanging Tree: Gatrell on Emotion and 
History, 40 BRIT. J. OF CRIMINOLOGY 1, passim (2000).  What matters for the argument here 
is that the people evaluating the bill, both in Virginia and in France, found those aspects of 
the bill to be its most troubling, reflecting long-term trends towards discomfort with public, 
physical violence.  
124  Kathryn Preyer, Penal Measures in the American Colonies: An Overview, 26 AM. J. 
LEGAL HIST. 326, 342 (1982). 
125  Id.  The act in 1752 passed and made “malicious wounding and maiming a felony 
without benefit of clergy,” however, the measure in 1772 dealt with the same offense but 
failed to pass. Id. 
126  Preyer, supra note 103, at 81. 
127  Preyer notes that it is difficult to make definitive statements because the trial court 
records for much of this period were burned during the Civil War in 1865. Id. at 70. 
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long-term decrease in interpersonal violence in Western Europe that began 
by at least the seventeenth century.128  For example, J.M. Beattie points to a 
long-term decrease in the homicide rate in England between 1660 and 
1800.129  Beattie links this change in the murder and manslaughter rates 
with broader changes in society that revealed a “growing antipathy toward 
cruelty and extreme physical violence.”130  There is no study comparable in 
breadth or depth of colonial America.131  However, if Beattie is correct that 
 
128  BEATTIE, supra, note 14, at 111–12. See generally NORBERT ELIAS, THE CIVILIZING 
PROCESS: SOCIOGENETIC AND PSYCHOGENETIC INVESTIGATIONS (Eric Dunning, et al. ed., 
Edmund Jephcott trans., 2000); STEVEN PINKER, THE BETTER ANGELS OF OUR NATURE: WHY 
VIOLENCE HAS DECLINED (2012). 
129  BEATTIE, supra note 14, at 111–12.  He argues that there was a reduction in the   
. . . number of deaths in quarrels, of murder in the furtherance of robbery, and of deliberate and 
planned killing. Men and women would seem to have become more controlled, less likely to 
strike out when annoyed or challenged, less likely to settle an argument or assert their will by 
recourse to a knife or their fists, a pistol, or a sword. . . . This supposes a developing civility, 
expressed perhaps in a more highly developed politeness of manner and a concern not to offend 
or to take offense, and an enlarged sensitivity toward some forms of cruelty and pain.  
Id.  He argues that this suggests that changes in sensibilities were not simply occurring at the 
level of elites but that it had trickled down to “at least the broad ranks of the artisans, 
tradesmen, and shopkeepers.”  Id. at 112.  
130  Id. at 135.   
One can see that on one level in the growing hostility toward violent sports, particularly blood 
sports like bull-baiting and throwing at cocks, and cruelty to animals in general.  There are signs 
of that before 1750, but it was particularly strong in the last two decades of the eighteenth 
century and into the nineteenth.  This was surely linked in turn with the more broadly developing 
sentiment antipathetic to cruelty of other kinds that helped to encourage opposition to the slave 
trade or support for prison reform or the abolition of capital punishment, all of which emerged 
toward the end of the century. 
Id. at 135–136. He further connects this to changes in domestic and family relations, where 
acceptable methods of discipline and control within the family shifted.   
These broadly changing ideas about violence, within the family and without, are reflected in 
stiffening penalties imposed by the courts after the middle of the eighteenth century for wife-
beating and the abuse of children, and in the increasing willingness of the courts to establish 
clearer criminal responsibility in deaths caused by accidents and other manslaughter.  Such 
charges proceeded not in response to legislation, but from a shift in attitude on the part of jurors 
and judges and from what was at bottom a growing hostility towards forms of physical violence 
that had been readily accepted a hundred years earlier. 
Id. at 136. For another example of this type of argument, see generally PINKER, supra 
note 128. 
131  Linda Kealey notes that levels of personal violence were “fairly consistent,” in the 
second half of the eighteenth century in Massachusetts. Linda Kealey, Patterns of 
Punishment: Massachusetts in the Eighteenth Century, 30 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 163, 169 
(1986).  Other sources indicate that in Massachusetts, the level of personal violence was 
always low.  See, e.g., EDWIN POWERS, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN EARLY MASSACHUSETTS 
1620–1692, A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 400–23 (1966); David H. Flaherty, Crime and Social 
Control in Provincial Massachusetts, 24 HIST. J. 339, 342–43 (1981); Preyer, supra note 
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there was a long-term process of decreasing acceptance of interpersonal 
violence, then aspects of Jefferson’s bill take on a slightly different cast.  As 
Preyer notes, “[i]t is significant that in Jefferson’s bill all penalties for 
offenses against the person were extremely severe—castration for rape, for 
example.  Apparently the revisors believed that these crimes constituted a 
greater threat to the social fabric of the new Commonwealth than crimes 
against property.”132  These offenses in which individuals committed acts of 
violence against other people were seen as particularly troubling at a time 
when the long-term trend appears to have been towards a diminishing of 
precisely these types of violence.  Thus, the apparently inhumane aspects of 
the bill that imposed harsh penalties in instances of interpersonal violence 
were a response to a perception that Virginia may have been falling behind 
modern society in its decreasing acceptance of acts of interpersonal 
violence. 
A final modern aspect of the bill was its call for hard labor to replace 
capital punishment for most offenses.133  The bill was accompanied by 
another one that provided for the creation of a penitentiary.134  Although, as 
we will see, Massachusetts was about to start an experiment with 
incarceration, this bill would have led to the creation of the first specially 
constructed penitentiary in the colonies.135  Indeed, Jefferson sent a model 
for this penitentiary from France to officials in Virginia.136 
Although the bill did not come up for a vote during the Revolution, 
Jefferson was able to enact some of its provisions while he was governor of 
Virginia from June 1779 to June 1781.137  During this time, he “pardoned 
felons convicted of capital crimes on condition that they work for a term of 
years on a variety of public works—generally the lead mines.”138  This 
practice was followed by subsequent governors “until 1785 when the Court 
of Appeals determined that conditions attached to pardons were 
 
124, at 342–43. See generally EDGAR J. MCMANUS, LAW AND LIBERTY IN EARLY NEW 
ENGLAND: CRIMINAL JUSTICE AND DUE PROCESS, 1620–1692 (1993). 
132  Preyer, supra, note 103, at 68. 
133  64. A Bill for Proportioning Crimes and Punishments in Cases Heretofore Capital, 
18 June 1779, FOUNDERS ONLINE, http://founders.archives.gov/documents/Jefferson/01-02-
02-0132-0004-0064 (last visited Sept. 4, 2016). 
134  68. A Bill for the Employment, Government and Support of Malefactors Condemned 
to Labour for the Commonwealth, 18 June 1779, FOUNDERS ONLINE, http://founders.
archives.gov/documents/Jefferson/01-02-02-0132-0004-0068 (last visited Sept. 4, 2016). 
135  See id. 
136  Preyer, supra note 103, at 78–79. 
137  Id. at 68. 
138  Id.  
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unconstitutional.”139 
When the bill finally came up for a vote, Jefferson was in Paris as 
Minister to the French court.140  In conveying news of the bill’s demise by 
one vote in 1787, Madison stated that “‘[o]ur old bloody code141 is by this 
event fully restored.’”142  Virginia did achieve a revised criminal code with 
a marked reduction in capital crimes in 1796.143 
In Jefferson’s proposed revised criminal code, we thus see the modern 
impulse towards reduction in capital codes, proportionality in sentencing, 
and a concern with reducing Virginia’s troubled history of interpersonal 
violence.  At the same time, the response of Jefferson and his European 
interlocutors to the physical punishments called for in some of the 
provisions reveal changing attitudes towards punishments directly imposed 
on the body of the condemned. 
B. MASSACHUSETTS: REPUBLICANISM AND THE BLOODY CODE 
While the example of Virginia reveals changing attitudes towards 
violence and physical punishments, the experiment in Massachusetts with 
an alternative to capital punishment demonstrates how those changes 
impacted the goals the Founders had for the new governments.  They 
believed that a republican form of government would be distinguished from 
monarchical ones, in part, in the different forms of punishment that it 
embraced.144  Extensive use of capital codes was seen as not only 
unenlightened, but also monarchical and un-republican. 
While Virginia was debating an extensive revision to its criminal 
codes, which would have entailed embracing a new form of punishment in 
the form of a penitentiary, Massachusetts was embarking on a more modest 
yet similar reform of penal practice.  In 1785, Massachusetts became the 
first state after independence to adopt incarceration in a prison as a potential 
 
139  Id. at 68–69. 
140  Id. at 69. 
141  See infra Part II.B for a discussion of the significance of the term “Bloody Code.” 
142  Preyer, supra note 103, at 69 (quoting Madison to Jefferson (Feb. 15, 1787)).  
Madison attributed the failure of the bill to a rage against horse stealers. Id. 
143  Id. at 76. 
144  HIRSCH, supra note 99, at 51; see also STEVEN WILF, LAW’S IMAGINED REPUBLIC: 
POPULAR POLITICS AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN REVOLUTIONARY AMERICA 138–64 (2010); 
MCLENNAN, supra note 99, at 18–23. Hirsch notes, however, that republicanism cut two 
ways because it simultaneously raised concerns regarding the fragility of that type of 
government and over the threat individualism and corruption posed to the new government.  
HIRSCH, supra note 99, at 51. But see MASUR, supra note 14, at 60 for an argument that the 
high crime rate merely heightened the desire for a reformed criminal code.   
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criminal penalty.145  Castle Island, “a fortress guarding Boston harbor,” was 
appointed for this purpose and was to receive individuals sentenced 
throughout the state.146  The Castle Island Act emerged out of a commission 
that was to consider revisions to the colonial law code more generally.147  
These types of commissions were common in the colonies during and 
following the Revolution (Jefferson’s bill was itself part of this 
movement).148  Among other changes the commission introduced were 
more narrow definitions of certain capital crimes such as burglary, robbery, 
and arson, as well as a reduction in the number of capital offenses with time 
spent at hard labor being used as a substitute.149  Within Castle Island, the 
prisoners “lived under military-like discipline,” were to be kept at “fatigue 
work” and wore matching uniforms.150 
Attempts to explain why imprisonment arose as an alternative 
punishment in Massachusetts at this time demonstrate the complexity of 
finding causal explanations for penal reform.  At the same time, an 
examination of the debates surrounding penal reform in general, and the 
need to find an alternative to the death penalty in particular, occurring both 
in Massachusetts and elsewhere in the colonies, demonstrates the relevance 
of those debates to the overall project of constructing republican 
governance in the new nation.  References to Beccaria were most 
noteworthy for indicating a desire for penal reform, rather than the specific 
content of that reform.151  Although other distinguished jurists such as 
William Blackstone and William Eden embraced his philosophies, none of 
them provided a theory of penal practice that could be adopted by the 
American states.152  Instead, they focused on the problems of sanguinary or 
cruel criminal codes without indicating what a more enlightened code 
would look like.153 Thus, while the ubiquitous references to Beccaria should 
then be taken as a measure of the perceived need for criminal law reform, 
rather than as a set of precepts for what form reformed punishment would 
take, references to that thinker did frequently entail a critique of the 
extensive use of capital punishment. 
 
145  Id. at 11. 
146  Id.  
147  Id. at 47. 
148  See id.   
149  Linda Kealey, Punishment at Hard Labor: Stephen Burroughs and the Castle Island 
Prison, 1785–1798, 57 NEW ENG. Q. 249, 250–51 (1984). 
150  Id. at 251.   
151  HIRSCH, supra note 99, at 26. 
152  MCLENNAN, supra note 99, at 25. 
153  Id. 
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While Jefferson’s bill proposed an overall reduction in capital crimes, 
there was nothing particularly in Beccaria’s thought that suggested the 
alternative punishment that Jefferson’s bill proposed: hard labor.  Hard 
labor was a penalty that had been proposed at various times during the 
previous two centuries, both in England and in the colonies but never really 
implemented as a punishment for the more serious categories of crime.154  
“Workhouses” or “houses of correction” were constructed in England 
starting in the sixteenth century to address a perceived problem with 
vagrancy.155  Their inhabitants were not those charged with more serious 
crime such as burglary, rather they have been described as: “[u]nruly 
apprentices, sturdy beggars, strumpets, vagrants and rogues.”156  The goal 
of the workhouse was to replace idleness with industry by forcing the 
vagrant to work.157  Because there was this goal of reformation, 
“conscientious management of the institution became “essential” and in 
order to “protect the integrity of the workhouse’s rehabilitative routine, 
authorities provided codes of regulations for its orderly government, which 
was monitored by the local justice of the peace.”158  Massachusetts, 
Pennsylvania, and New York all had workhouses by the early eighteenth 
century.159  Throughout the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, there were 
serious proposals in England and the colonies to introduce hard labor as a 
penalty for criminals.160  For example, Massachusetts passed legislation in 
1749 and 1750, prescribing hard labor in the state’s workhouses for those 
convicted of extortion and counterfeiting.161  A bill proposed in 1765 
 
154  HIRSCH, supra note 99, at 28.  
155  Id. at 13–14. 
156  NEGLEY K. TEETERS, THE CRADLE OF THE PENITENTIARY: THE WALNUT STREET JAIL 
AT PHILADELPHIA 1773–1835, at 4 (1955). 
157  HIRSCH, supra note 99, at 14. 
158  Id. at 15.  Among which were: “[u]nlike jail keepers, all workhouse officers were to 
be ‘fitly qualified’ for their posts.  And to ensure that the rehabilitative routine was not 
threatened by disease, authorities mandated the first rudimentary hygienic precautions 
against the afflictions endemic to other carceral facilities.” Id. 
159  Id. at 27.  Rothman argues that the workhouses were not a significant aspect of 
colonial poor relief, though Hirsch argues persuasively against this interpretation.  Compare 
DAVID J. ROTHMAN, THE DISCOVERY OF THE ASYLUM: SOCIAL ORDER AND DISORDER IN THE 
NEW REPUBLIC 25–29 (1971), with HIRSCH, supra note 99, at 26–31. 
160  HIRSCH, supra note 99, at 16–17; see also BEATTIE, supra, note 14, at 492–500 for a 
discussion of proposals to use incarceration in houses of correction in early eighteenth-
century England.  Beattie argues that transportation ultimately displaced this experiment for 
much of the eighteenth century though the idea “re-emerged powerfully in the third quarter 
of the century at the heart of a new dominant penal ideology.”  Id. at 500.  See id. at 520–24 
for a proposal to change the punishment for felonies to confinement in hard labor at the dock 
yards. 
161  HIRSCH, supra note 99, at 28. 
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“would have introduced the punishment comprehensively.”162 
Although Pennsylvania implemented hard labor in a house of 
correction under Penn’s Law, implemented in 1682, this was done away 
with in 1718, and little is known about the actual functioning of that law or 
its penal measures.163  The first state to actually introduce hard labor as a 
penalty for serious crimes in the eighteenth century was Connecticut.164  In 
1773, the Connecticut General Assembly passed a resolution indicating 
their desire to find a facility “‘for the purpose of confining, securing and 
profitably employing such criminals as may be committed to them by any 
future law or laws of this Colony, in lieu of the infamous punishments in 
divers cases now appointed.’”165  A group of mines, known as the Simsbury 
copper mines, were purchased and secured for this purpose.166  By the end 
of that year, individuals found guilty of five kinds of offenses: robbery, 
burglary, forgery, counterfeiting, and horse theft could be sentenced to the 
prison.167  Prior to the creation of this prison, those guilty of these offenses 
would have been subjected to various forms of corporal punishment, 
including branding and removal of an ear (first-time burglary offenses) or 
execution (third-time burglary offenders).168  The mines were closed in 
1782 “for the duration of the hostilities with Britain.”169  Although 
legislation was passed in 1783 to construct a more secure facility on the 
site, it was not until 1790 that Connecticut opened Newgate as a statewide 
prison.170  As was seen above, Jefferson started a similar practice in 
Virginia while he was governor during the revolution, but it ended in 
 
162  Id. 
163  ORLANDO LEWIS, THE DEVELOPMENT OF AMERICAN PRISONS AND PRISON CUSTOMS, 
1776–1845 10 (1922); see also Herbert William Keith Fitzroy, The Punishment of Crime in 
Provincial Pennsylvania, 60 PA. MAG. HIST. & BIOGRAPHY 242 (1936); Lawrence Gipson, 
Crime and Its Punishment in Provincial Pennsylvania: A Phase of the Social History of the 
Commonwealth, 2 PA. HIST. 3 (1935); William Lloyd, Jr., The Courts of Pennsylvania in the 
Eighteenth Century Prior to the Revolution, 56 U. PA. L. REV. 28 (1908); Paul Lermack, 
Peace Bonds and Criminal Justice in Colonial Philadelphia, 100 PA. MAG. HIST. & 
BIOGRAPHY 173 (1976); Preyer, supra note 124, at 336; G.S. Rowe, Black Offenders, 
Criminal Courts, and Philadelphia Society in the Late Eighteenth-Century, 22 J. SOC. HIST. 
685 (1989). 
164  HIRSCH, supra note 99, at 56; Alexis M. Durham III, Newgate of Connecticut Origins 
and Early Days of an Early American Prison, 6 JUST. Q. 89, 90 (1989). 
165  Durham, supra note 164, at 90–91 (quoting Public Records of the Colony of 
Connecticut May 1773, at 92–93).   
166  RICHARD H. PHELPS, A HISTORY OF NEWGATE OF CONNECTICUT 6, 92 (1860).   
167  Durham, supra note 164 at 90.   
168  Id. at 93. 
169  Id. at 101–03.   
170  HIRSCH, supra note 99, at 11 n.87; Durham, supra note 164, at 103.   
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1785.171 
Hirsch argues that the workhouse model, and the ideology of reform 
through hard work that it embodied, provided the justifying language and 
form for the new Castle Island Act.172  But while the workhouse provided a 
model for the structure of the new penalties, there is still the question of 
why it was adopted at this time rather than when proposals had been put 
forward earlier in the century.  There are two related answers to this 
question.  The first is that colonial society underwent substantial changes in 
the second half of the eighteenth century, and the traditional punishments 
that had worked in the close-knit colonial towns were breaking down as the 
population both grew and became more mobile.173  The second is that the 
old punishments were no longer seen as effective, in part because of 
changing attitudes towards the relationship between punishment and the 
state.174  Hirsch argues that “by the 1780s . . . tracts proposing hard labor 
had taken on an alarmist tone, and the emphasis had shifted to a delineation 
of the demerits of the prevailing body of sanctions.”175 
The traditional punishments of the admonition,176 fines (with sale into 
service being their alternative) and public punishments such as whipping, 
all depended on a “communal pattern of life.”177  The punishments reflected 
the fact of embeddedness within the community: “[t]he usual penalties . . . 
did not sever a criminal’s ties with society,” and the penalty with the 
longest duration (sale into servitude178) had a “probable effect . . . to 
 
171  See infra Part II.A. 
172  HIRSCH, supra note 99, at 31. 
173  Id. at 35–36. 
174  This is true whether that changing relationship was defined by republicanism, 
HIRSCH, supra note 99, at 50–53, or by liberalism, MICHAEL MERANZE, LABORATORIES OF 
VIRTUE: PUNISHMENT, REVOLUTION, AND AUTHORITY IN PHILADELPHIA, 1760–1835 at 12–16 
(1996). 
175  Id. at 37.  Masur argues that “Americans in post-Revolutionary America believed 
that criminal activity raged out of control. . . . This social perception of crime on the loose 
intensified the desire to restructure the criminal justice system.”  MASUR, supra note 14, 
at 59. 
176  This involved an appearance by the offender in “open court for a formal admonition 
by the magistrate, a public confession of wrongdoing, and a pronouncement of sentence, 
wholly or partially suspended to symbolize forgiveness.”  HIRSCH, supra note 99, at 4. 
177  Id. at 4.  For a description of colonial penalties, see MCMANUS, supra note 131, at 
164–79, 200–10; POWERS, supra note 131, at 163–320; Flaherty, supra note 131, at 349–52; 
Kealey, supra note 131, at 171.  
178  Preyer, supra note 124, at 343.  Individuals were sold into servitude when they were 
unable to pay the fine that was the primary penalty. Id.  Because property offenses typically 
involved triple restitution, a fine in those cases frequently resulted in the offender being sold 
into servitude in order to pay off the fine. Id.  The incidence of sale into servitude increased 
in the 1730s and 1740s, with those in the 1740s receiving comparatively longer terms of 
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integrate [the convicted] more fully into society by reorienting him toward 
normal social contacts.”179  In the second half of the eighteenth century, 
however, the population of the state became increasingly transient and 
individuals charged with crimes were no longer necessarily integrated 
members of the community.180  As a result, the various penalties that made 
up the colonial penal code came to be seen as ineffective.181  Sale into 
servitude all but stopped, presumably because people were unwilling to take 
on a stranger, particularly a criminal stranger, to labor for them.182 
Admonition fell away as crimes were increasingly committed by strangers 
to the community and a culture of privacy developed that made established 
members of the community reluctant to discuss their offenses in public.183  
Finally, with regard to public punishments such as whipping or time spent 
in the stocks, while the goal had previously been to reintegrate the offender 
into the community “when the offender lacked community ties, this formula 
no longer applied.  In such cases, the purpose of these sanctions shifted to 
expulsion, by alerting townspeople to the culprits’ infamy.”184  This resulted 
in public punishments administered to strangers that created mutual 
antipathy rather than reintegrating the offender into the community.185 One 
response was to increase the recourse to capital punishment.186  But this 
posed a dilemma, as described by one newspaper: “[a]lthough ‘[a]t present, 
our laws are no more a check to simple robbery [than] they are to getting 
money honestly,’ the alternative of ‘tak[ing] a man’s life for every trifling 
theft, as is done in England, is a disgrace to a civilized nation; humanity 
recoils from the idea.’”187 
Herein lay the heart of the problem: in America following the 
Revolution, traditional sanctions not only came into question because of the 
changing nature of society, but because they were seen as a corrupt 
inheritance from England.188  During this time, Americans began to refer to 
England’s code as “bloody,” “unit[ing] England’s capital statutes into a 
 
service. Id.   
179  WILLIAM NELSON, AMERICANIZATION OF THE COMMON LAW: THE IMPACT OF LEGAL 
CHANGE ON MASSACHUSETTS SOCIETY, 1760–1830, at 40 (1975). 
180  HIRSCH, supra note 99, at 35–36. 
181  Id. at 36–39.  
182  Id. at 37–38. 
183  Id. at 38. 
184  Id. at 40. 
185  HIRSCH, supra note 99, at 39. 
186  Id. at 40. 
187  Id. at 41 (quoting MASS. CENTINEL, Oct. 16, 1784, at 1). 
188  Id. at 47–48; MCLENNAN, supra note 99, at 19–23. 
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common ‘code’ with bloodshed as its centerpiece.”189  In part, this was a 
result of the very large number of offenses that could result in the death 
penalty (by 1776 there were nearly 200).190  There were frequent references 
in the newspapers to the number of executions in England: “No other 
country in the civilized world, it was often stated, had as many executions 
as England.”191  Benjamin Rush estimated that from 1688 (the year of the 
Glorious Revolution) to 1787, there had been 70,000 executions in 
England.192  Recent evidence suggests that his estimate was far from 
correct.193 2,000 is a more accurate number, but the fact that he believed the 
exaggerated number was accurate underscores perceptions in America of 
England’s excessive reliance on the death penalty.194 
Criticism of this “Bloody Code” became ubiquitous in the 1780s and 
90s, and the extensive capital codes were connected with physical, public 
punishments in a category of penalties referred to as “sanguinary.”195 
“Critics argued that capital and related sanguinary punishments were 
inherently despotic and immoral in nature,” while “[b]loody and ‘excessive’ 
spectacles of punishment . . . were the native weapons of kings and 
despots.”196  While not all of the Founders opposed capital punishment in 
all circumstances, they did all associate excessive use of that penalty with 
monarchical forms of government.197 
This relationship between the perception of England as “Bloody” and 
the perceived need for penal reform in the colonies can be seen in a number 
 
189  WILF, supra note 144, at 138.   
190  Id. at 139. 
191  Id. at 142. 
192  Id. 
193  Id. 
194  WILF, supra note 144, at 142. 
195  Id. at 138–54; MCLENNAN, supra note 99, at 18–19. 
196  MCLENNAN, supra note 99, at 19. 
197  Id.  Benjamin Rush (Philadelphia physician and signer of the Declaration of 
Independence and the Constitution) and William Bradford (Attorney General under 
President Washington) were perhaps the most famous proponents of a complete abolition of 
the death penalty at the time, though others indicated support for the cause. BESSLER, supra 
note 1, at 66–96.  Rothman makes a similar point:  
Armed with patriotic fervor, sharing a repugnance for things British and a new familiarity with 
and faith in Enlightenment doctrines, they posited that the origins and persistence of deviant 
behavior would be found in the nature of the colonial criminal codes.  Established in the days of 
oppression and ignorance, the laws reflected British insistence on severe and cruel punishment.  
ROTHMAN, supra note 159, at 59.  As does Michael Meranze: “Revolutionary-era reformers 
forcefully redefined exemplary punishments as cruel and excessive.  They linked the practice 
of capital and corporal punishments to the archaisms of tyranny and monarchy.” MERANZE, 
supra note 174, at 68. 
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of state constitutions calling for a reduction in so-called “sanguinary” laws.  
For example, Maryland’s constitution, adopted on November 11, 1776, was 
the first to do so with this provision: “[t]hat sanguinary laws ought to be 
avoided, as far as is consistent with the safety of the State: and no law, to 
inflict cruel and unusual pains and penalties, ought to be made in any case, 
or at any time hereafter.”198  Similarly, South Carolina’s constitution of 
1778 included a provision: “[t]hat the penal Laws, as heretofore used, shall 
be reformed, and Punishments made, in some Cases less sanguinary, and, in 
general, more proportionate to the crime.”199  Pennsylvania (1776) and 
Vermont (1777) had identical provisions that provided for “punishing by 
hard labour” in order to “make sanguinary punishments less necessary.”200 
It was thus in marked contrast to the portrayal of England as “Bloody” 
that the colonists sought to reform their own criminal laws and these 
reforms “served as outward legitimating representations of the American 
Revolution” and “[b]y signaling differences with English criminal law, 
states were announcing the special character of justice in fledgling 
American republics.”201  “A repulsion from the gallows rather than any faith 
in the penitentiary spurred the late-eighteenth century construction. . . . 
Incarceration seemed more humane than hanging and less brutal than 
whipping.”202  There were thus two arguments with regard to the criminal 
laws and punishment that were being made. First, there was “a coherent 
American critique of what the revolutionaries argued were ‘monarchical’ 
penal laws and practices,” which led to “a positive republican theory of 
crime, penal law, and penal practice.”203  The critique was of a capital code 
that was seen to be excessive because it included everything from murder to 
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201  WILF, supra note 144, at 146, 148.  The focus here is on attempts to use a reformed 
criminal law as one marker of the difference between a republican form of government and a 
monarchical one.  This is not to suggest that similar calls for reform were not also occurring 
in England.  Michael Ignatieff traces the ideological beginnings of the penitentiary to this 
period. See IGNATIEFF, supra note 102, at 44–79.  Although V.A.C. Gatrell argues that 
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petty theft and physical punishments that were directed at the body of the 
condemned.204  Criminal law took on political meaning as punishment was 
evaluated as being appropriate (or not) to a republican form of 
government.205  “A new understanding of criminal law emerged around the 
time of the American Revolution.  Criminal justice was seen as a mirror 
that reflected truths about the surrounding political and social structure,” 
and “[p]enal reform created an outward representation of the new republic, 
playing much the same role as health care or literacy programs for 
twentieth-century revolutions.  The political authority of the nascent 
republic turned in part upon its remaking of criminal law.”206  Thus, by 
rejecting England’s excessive capital code and reliance on punishments 
directed at the body of the offender, the American colonies were signaling 
to themselves and the rest of the world what it meant to be republican.207 
While the rhetoric of the period saw the question of a revised criminal 
code as central to the creation of a new type of government, the actual 
changes wrought by the Castle Island Act should not be overstated.  Under 
the new law, hard labor was an option, but not a requirement, and it did not 
immediately replace corporal punishment.208  Although a statute was 
proposed and passed by the Massachusetts House of Representatives in 
1785 making hard labor an alternative in all cases where corporal 
punishment was an option, it failed to pass the Senate and corporal 
punishment was not officially ended until 1826 (although it had fallen out 
of use in the first decade of the nineteenth century).209  Moreover, the 
experiment with incarceration as an alternative penalty was short lived. 
Castle Island was sold to the federal government in 1789 to be used for 
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205  “Many publicists distinguished a republic from a monarchy not only by its liberal 
political objectives but also by its lack of a strong state coercive apparatus.”  HIRSCH, supra 
note 99, at 51. The term “publicist” refers to anyone publishing a political tract.  See BAILYN, 
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long and varied history.  Guy Geltner has recently argued that the depiction of past or simply 
other regimes as relying on brutal physical punishments has been extensively used as a form 
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arguments that there has been a long-term trend towards decreasing reliance on corporal 
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military purposes.210  Massachusetts’s next prison, in Charlestown, did not 
open until 1799.211  Still, Castle Island was the “first American carceral 
institution to achieve international celebrity.”212  Within a year, there was “a 
pilot project in the city of New York and . . . a statewide program in 
Pennsylvania.”213 
C. PENNSYLVANIA: CIVILIZATION AND CHANGING SENSIBILITIES 
Rather than follow the lead of Massachusetts and embrace hard labor 
within an institutional setting, Pennsylvania first experimented with hard 
labor conducted in public.214  The rapid breakdown of this experiment led to 
the adoption in 1790 of hard labor within the Walnut Street Prison, which 
became famous throughout the new nation and internationally as other 
jurisdictions sought examples of more humane punishments.215  The reasons 
why hard labor in public ultimately broke down provide the final link in 
explaining the content and depth of post-revolutionary penal reform.  The 
example of Pennsylvania thus demonstrates that the focus of penal reform 
was not simply on reducing the infliction of capital punishment, it was also 
ultimately focused on reducing the public infliction of physical 
chastisements. 
The discussion of Massachusetts above reveals that in the post-
Revolutionary period, Americans defined their republican form of 
government, and the reformed penal practice it would entail, in opposition 
to England’s Bloody Code.  It was not just as a contrast to England’s 
“sanguinary” practices that this definition of republican criminal practice 
was being defined, however.  Frequently in the accounts, references to 
bloody codes and sanguinary practices gave way to descriptions of such 
penal practices as being savage or barbaric.216  These terms connect penal 
reform not just with the creation of a republican government, but also a 
more civilized one.  This point becomes more apparent in debates over 
public punishments in Pennsylvania in the late 1780s.217 
References to British penal practices as being “savage” or “barbaric” 
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were almost as common as references to their Bloody Code.218  For 
example, a charge given in 1793 to a Philadelphia grand jury stated: “In 
England . . . their books are crowded with penal statutes which appear to 
have resulted from the barbarous dictates of revenge.”219  Harsh 
punishments with little purpose aside from their harshness were seen by 
commentators as exemplary of less developed states: “Amongst unpolished 
nations, and during the prevalence of savage manners punishment is the 
only means known for preserving public order. . . . When one proves 
ineffectual, he thinks of another more rigourous.”220  England’s system of 
punishment was described as having been “‘copied from the Goth and the 
Vandal.’”221  Rebecca McLennan argues, “[c]onnections were drawn 
between British ‘savagery’ on the battlefield and the frequency with which 
the courts in England reputedly condemned Englishmen, found guilty of 
crimes grand and petty, to swing from the ‘hanging tree.’”222  As an 
example, Thomas Paine described British war acts as “contrary to the 
practice of all nations but savages,” and later asked “[w]hat sort of men 
must Englishmen be . . . ? The history of the most savage Indians does not 
produce instances exactly of this kind.’”223  To the Americans, extensive 
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England.  When arguing for the need to reform the criminal law in Virginia in 1796 a state 
legislator referred to the old code as “barbaric.” WILF, supra note 144, at 140–41; Preyer, 
supra note 103, at 77. 
219  See, e.g., WILF, supra note 144, at 140. 
220  MERANZE, supra note 174, at 70–71 (quoting An Essay on Capital Punishment, in 
FREEMEN’S JOURNAL, Sept. 7, 1785). 
221  HIRSCH, supra note 99, at 48. Masur also found critiques of British “barbaric 
behavior.”  He argues that “many Americans believed in ‘the barbarity of our oppresors’ and 
were horrified at repeated examples of ‘inhuman and worse than savage cruelty’ by the 
British.”  MASUR, supra note 14, at 55.  He also quotes Abigail Adams referring to the 
British as “our Barbarous foes” who “let loose the infernal savages.’”  Id.  In April 1777, “a 
committee appointed by Congress reported its findings on the conduct of British soldiers and 
found,” inter alia, “savage butchery.”  Id. at 56.  Referring to the execution of a militia 
member captured by loyalists, Thomas Paine wrote “‘as far as our knowledge goes there is 
not a more detestable character, nor a meaner or more barbarous enemy than the present 
British one. . . . [The execution] is an original in the history of civilized barbarians, and is 
truly British.’”  Id.  Washington referred to the same execution as “‘the most wanton, 
unprecedented and unhuman Murder that ever disgraced the arms of a civilized people.’”  Id. 
at 57.  In response to a proposal that the American troops execute one of their own prisoners 
of war in response, Alexander Hamilton wrote that “so solemn and deliberate a sacrifice of 
the innocent for the guilty must be condemned on the present received notions of humanity, 
and encourage an opinion that we are in a certain degree in a state o[f] barbarism.”  Id. at 58. 
222  MCLENNAN, supra note 99, at 19 (quoting MASUR, supra note 14, at 19).  
223  Id. at n.12 (quoting A Supernumerary Crisis, To Sir Guy Carleton, in CRISIS PAPERS, 
Philadelphia, May 31, 1782). 
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use of capital punishment was “central to the organization of English 
society” and “England was portrayed in much the same way as Blackstone 
depicted primitive societies.”224  For example, one American essayist 
referred to the executed as “human sacrifices” that were “yearly offered 
up.”225 
This discussion provides important context for understanding the 
content of the reformed republican criminal law that was being embraced 
throughout the colonies.  By the late eighteenth century, the word 
“civilization” was beginning to take root.226  The first use of this term has 
been traced to Victor Riqueti Mirabeau in his work L’Ami des hommes.227  
The term, as used by Mirabeau, “referred . . . to a group of people who were 
polished, refined, and mannered, as well as virtuous in their social 
existence.”228  Within a short period of time, “the designation had swept 
over Europe and become commonplace in Enlightenment thought” and it 
“formed part of the idea of progress and became the third phase in 
conjectural history, signaling the last stage in the movement of humanity 
from savagery to barbarism and then to civilization.”229  While civilization 
represented a particular conception of evolutionary, progressive change, its 
content—that is to say, what it meant to be a civilized state—focused on 
defining what the bonds or connections were between members of 
society.230  For some, this meant a focus on manners or mores “as lying at 
the center of sociability,” while elsewhere emerging at the same time is a 
focus on the “public sphere,” the “social,” “social contract,” etc., all of 
which are “part of an effort to describe, understand, and project new forms 
 
224  WILF, supra note 144, at 141. 
225  Id.  It should be noted that this does not mean that objectively the American colonists 
were less brutal than the British.  Masur argues that “Americans . . . viewed themselves as 
the virtuous and humane citizens of a new nation,” while portraying the British as “debased 
and barbarous.”  MASUR, supra note 14, at 57.  At the same time, “[i]n actuality, patriots 
executed offenders as frequently and as barbarously as their enemies.”  Id. at 58.  Thus, it is 
not about a factual difference between the British and the Americans, rather is was about 
making a claim to cultural superiority on the part of the Americans.  See generally GELTNER, 
supra note 207. 
226  BRUCE MAZLISH, CIVILIZATION AND ITS CONTENTS 5 (2004).   
227  Id.  We know that at least Jefferson and Madison were familiar with this work.  See 
From Thomas Jefferson to James Madison, with a List of Books 1 September 1785, 
FOUNDERS ONLINE, http://founders.archives.gov/documents/Jefferson/01-08-02-0360 (last 
visited Sept. 4, 2016) (including Mirabeau’s L’Ami des hommes among a list of books 
Jefferson had purchased for and was sending to Madison). 
228  MAZLISH, supra note 226, at 7.  
229  Id. at 7–8. 
230  Id. at 8–11. See generally ELIAS, supra note 128. 
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of social bonding.”231 
Gordon Wood has pointed to this particular problem following the 
American Revolution: if the previous methods of holding society together 
(largely hierarchical in which everyone knew their place) were falling apart 
in a new republican government that assumed equality between all men, 
then what were to be the bonds that held society together?232  The Founders 
believed in their ability to shape a new society.233  Part of how they set 
about achieving that new society depended on their belief that “people were 
not born to be what they might become.”234  Lockean theory argued that 
people were shaped by their sensations and the mind, according to John 
Adams, “could be cultivated like a garden, with barbarous weeds eliminated 
and enlightened fruits raised, ‘the savages destroyed, . . . the civil People 
increased.’”235  This meant the “pushing back of darkness and what was 
called Gothic barbarism,” which took place on many fronts.236  Ultimately, 
all of these changes were connected to the concept of civilization.237  While 
civilization as a concept has been linked to changes in the material 
prosperity of a people: 
It was above all a matter of personal and social morality, of the ways in which men 
and women treated each other, their children, their dependents, even their animals.  
Such enlightened morality lay at the heart of republicanism.  Americans thought 
themselves more civilized and humane than the British precisely because they had 
adopted republican governments, which as Benjamin Rush said, were “peaceful and 
benevolent forms of government” requiring “mild and benevolent principles.”  With 
the Revolution they sought to express these mild and benevolent principles in a 
variety of reforms—most notably perhaps in their new systems of criminal 
punishment.238 
Herein lies the heart of the matter: the changes sought to create a more 
virtuous citizenry—one that was required for civilization to flourish—
would be pursued in no small part by implementing a reformed criminal 
code. 
But what change in the criminal code would lead to this transformation 
 
231  MAZLISH, supra note 226, at 10–12. 
232  GORDON S. WOOD, THE RADICALISM OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 189 (1991).  
Elsewhere he describes that a struggle “to find new attachments befitting a republican 
people . . . they sought enlightened connections to hold their new popular societies together.”  
Id. at ix. 
233  Id. at 190. 
234  Id.  
235  Id. (quoting John Adams to Jonathan Sewell (Feb. 1760)). 
236  Id. at 191. 
237  Id. at 192. 
238  WOOD, supra note 232, at 192.  
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in the citizenry?  To understand this problem, we need to more closely 
examine Pennsylvania’s experiment with public labor.239 The changes 
wrought in Pennsylvania’s penal practice were the most far reaching of the 
penal reforms attempted in the 1780s, and they foreshadowed much of the 
changes that other states would pursue in the 1790s.  The first indication of 
the sweeping changes to come can be found in Pennsylvania’s first state 
constitution, adopted in 1776. It provided that: 
To deter more effectually from the commission of crimes, by continued visible 
punishments of long duration, and to make sanguinary punishments less necessary; 
houses ought to be provided for punishing by hard labour, those who shall be 
convicted of crimes not capital; wherein the criminals shall be employed for the 
benefit of the public, or for reparation of injuries done to private persons. And all 
persons at proper times shall be admitted to see the prisoners at their labour.240 
It was not until 1786 that legislation was passed to give effect to this 
provision.  In that year an act was passed that called for “continued hard 
labor, publicly and disgracefully imposed . . . in streets of cities and towns, 
and upon the highways of the open country and other public works.”241  The 
act also reduced the number of capital crimes (robbery, burglary and 
sodomy were removed) and replaced whipping and other public 
punishments with hard labor.242  By replacing whipping and some capital 
punishments, the system of public labor “greatly reduced reliance on 
sanguinary penalties” at the same time that it “would turn convicts into 
constant reminders of the penalties of vice.”243  Thus, Pennsylvania sought 
to retain the benefits of public punishment and the visibility of the 
condemned minus the problematic aspects of physical punishments aimed 
at the body of the convict.244 
 
239  Other states experimented with public labor, for example a public labor act passed in 
Rhode Island.  MCLENNAN, supra, note 99, at 33 n.63. New York also started a pilot project 
in New York City in 1785. HIRSCH, supra, note 99, at 25. Under the project, hard labor was 
to occur in an existing workhouse, though apparently, it was in reality performed on public 
works in the city. Id.  Incarceration at hard labor was not expanded statewide in New York 
until 1796.  Id. at 11 n.87. 
240  PA. CONST. of 1776, §39. Vermont’s Constitution, adopted in 1777, contained an 
almost identical provision. VT. CONST. of 1777, art. II, § XXXV. 
241  Thorsten Sellin, Philadelphia Prisons of the Eighteenth Century, 43 TRANS. AM. 
PHIL. SOC’Y 326, 327 (1953); MERANZE, supra note 174, at 21–22. 
242  MERANZE, supra note 174, at 79. 
243   Id. at 55. 
244  Merenze, like Hirsch, attributes the driving force for penal reform to rising fears of 
criminality, even while the ideology behind that reform was expressed in terms of 
“‘enlightened’ moderation.  Id. at 67.  To acknowledge that there were forces other than the 
purely ideological that helped push forward penal reform is not to diminish the significance 
of the ideological.  As David Garland argues, penal form is always over determined and 
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From the beginning, the program of public labor was beset by 
problems.  The prisoners wore a ball and chain while they went about their 
work, and sometimes used this to injure passersby.245  Their cloths were 
specially designed to bring attention, described as: “‘A parti-colored 
scheme. . . . The roundabout would have sleeves of different colors, as for 
example, red and green, black and white, or blue and yellow. The legs of 
the pantaloons were also of different colors.’”246  There were complaints 
that the prisoners engaged in theft while at their public labor, and escapes 
were frequent.247 
Aside from the complaints regarding the problems of public safety and 
maintaining the prisoners at hard labor, a deeper complaint was made by 
Dr. Benjamin Rush.  Rush was a signer of both the Declaration of 
Independence and the Constitution.248 A prominent member of Philadelphia 
Society, he took a particular interest in penal reform.249  Rush presented a 
paper at the home of Benjamin Franklin in 1787 criticizing public 
punishments in general.250  In it he argued that they “end to make bad men 
worse, and to increase crimes, by their influence upon society . . . it is 
always connected with infamy, it destroys in the criminal the sense of 
shame which is one of the strongest outposts of virtue.”251  He concluded by 
arguing that “‘I cannot help entertaining the hope that the time is not very 
far distant when the gallows, the pillory, the stocks, the whipping post and 
the wheelbarrow (the usual engines of public punishments) will be 
connected with the history of the rack, and the stake, as marks of barbarity 
of ages and countries.’”252 
At the same time that this experiment was occurring in Philadelphia, 
the Constitutional Convention was convening there to draft a new 
Constitution.253  The Walnut Street Jail was located just across the street 
from the state house where the Convention was held: “Outside the walls of 
 
there will generally be multiple explanations for a given outcome.  GARLAND, supra note 16, 
at 280–81 (1990). 
245  TEETERS, supra note 156, at 27. 
246  Id. at 28 (citation omitted). 
247  Id. 
248  BESSLER, supra note 1, at 53. 
249  Id. at 66. 
250  Id. at 69. 
251  BENJAMIN RUSH, AN ENQUIRY INTO THE EFFECTS OF PUBLIC PUNISHMENTS UPON 
CRIMINALS AND UPON SOCIETY 4 (1787) (reprinted in Reform of Criminal Law in 
Pennsylvania (Morton Horowitz & Stanley Katz eds., 1972)). 
252  Id. at 18. 
253  See generally CATHERINE DRINKER BOWEN, MIRACLE AT PHILADELPHIA: THE STORY 
OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION, MAY TO SEPTEMBER 1787 (1986). 
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the state house, the prisoners at the Walnut Street Jail—in close proximity 
to the Convention proceedings, and cursing anyone who ignored them—
thrust long poles with cloth caps on the ends through the prison’s barred 
windows, seeking alms.”254 
Pennsylvania’s negative experience with public labor had an impact 
throughout the colonies.  For example, “[a]lthough he had earlier proposed 
public hard labor for prisoners, Jefferson wrote that by 1786 the 
Pennsylvania experience with the wheelbarrow laws had changed his 
mind.”255  Later in his autobiography, he recounted: “Exhibited as a public 
spectacle, with shaved heads and mean clothing, working on the high roads, 
produced in the criminals such a prostration of character, such an 
abandonment of self-respect, as, instead of reforming, plunged them into 
the most desperate and hardened depravity of morals and character.”256 
This same breakdown in public punishments could be seen in other 
states.  For example, in Massachusetts, “[a] culture of privacy” led to the 
breakdown of admonition as a penalty as offenders were no longer willing 
to provide public confessions of wrongdoing.257 Similarly, public 
punishments began to involve scenes of disorder: “Such sessions also 
became increasingly tumultuous affairs, in which offenders were liable to 
be pelted with refuse or worse.  Onlookers appear to have seized the 
occasions of public punishment to vent their frustration over crime, in the 
process creating scenes of chaos that would have been unheard of when 
they shared with offenders a sense of belonging to the same community.”258 
In Rush’s writings, we see a changing reaction to the site of physical 
suffering while in these scenes of public disorder surrounding public 
inflictions of punishment, we see officials’ increasing concern that the 
public was not reacting in the “correct” way to the punishments.259  
Meranze refers to the problem posed by public punishments as “mimetic 
corruption,” meaning that the message that officials intended to convey 
failed.260  The response of Dr. Rush and other Founders to sites of suffering 
suggest an even deeper problem, however.  The problem posed by public 
 
254  Id. at 114.  See also Simon P. Newman & Billy G. Smith, Incarcerated Innocents: 
Inmates, Conditions, and Survival Strategies in Philadelphia’s Almshouse and Jail, in 
BURIED LIVES: INCARCERATION IN EARLY AMERICA 60, 60 (Michele Lise Tarter et al. eds., 
2012). 
255  PESTRITTO, supra note 114115, at 123. 
256  THOMAS JEFFERSON, AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, 1743–1790, at 72 
(1821).  
257  HIRSCH, supra note 99, at 38.  
258  Id. at 40.  
259   See generally RUSH, supra note 251. 
260  MERANZE, supra note 174, at 87–88. 
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punishments and what officials sought to control was the emotional 
connection to the convicted criminal.261  Too much identification and the 
system of justice was subverted, but too little identification and the social 
bonds of moral sense that hold the community together would be threatened 
as well. 
This change in the individual emotional reaction to violence, the body 
and physical pain has been termed “sensibilities.”262  We already saw some 
influence of these changing sensibilities in the reaction to Jefferson’s Crime 
Bill (and suggested another influence in the evident concern the bill 
demonstrated with the problem of interpersonal violence).263  Here, it is 
evident again in the reactions of elites themselves to scenes of suffering, in 
their reaction to the problems of crowds, and their behavior during public 
punishments.  The public punishment is seen as brutalizing the sensibilities 
of those that observe it.  There is some debate among historians about the 
influence of changing sensibilities on penal form, but whether they drive 
the change or follow it, it is undeniable that over time attitudes have shifted 
and that which was once acceptable (whipping in public, for example) 
comes to be seen as abhorrent.264  Thus, it was not only to minimize the 
bloody or sanguinary effects of England’s criminal code that Americans 
sought reform, they also sought to reduce the public infliction of pain and 
suffering on convicts.265 
 
261  MASUR, supra note 14, at 79; RUSH, supra note 251, at 7–8. 
262  GARLAND, supra note 16, at 223. Summarized by David Garland, the argument is 
that:  
[T]he sight of violence, pain, or physical suffering has become highly disturbing and distasteful 
to modern sensibilities.  Consequently it is minimized wherever possible, though ironically this 
“suppression” of violence is actually premised upon the build-up of a state capacity for violence 
so great that it discourages unauthorized violence on the part of others.  And where violence does 
continue to be used it is usually removed from the public arena, and sanitized or disguised in 
various ways, often becoming the monopoly of specialist groups such as the army, the police, or 
the prison staff which conduct themselves in an impersonal, professional manner, avoiding the 
emotional intensity which such behavior threatens to arouse.  
Id. 
263  See supra, Part II.A.  
264  McGowen, supra note 123, at 6–7; see also discussion, supra note 123.  
265  MASUR, supra note 14, at 76–81; MERANZE, supra note 174, at 126–27. Two authors 
studying this process in Europe connect these changes in sensibility to larger changes in the 
structure of government, argue that “these developments are closely related to the rise of a 
network of states and the changes they underwent. Notably, the disappearance of public 
executions is related to the transition from the early modern state, whether absolutist or 
patrician, to the nation-state.” SPIERENBERG, supra note 19, at x. See generally ELIAS, supra 
note 128. Changes in sensibility have been used to explain the elimination of public 
executions during the nineteenth century in America.  MASUR, supra note 14, at 3.  
Numerous authors have connected changes in sensibility to the American Revolution and 
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Because of these “scandals” involving the wheelbarrow men, the 
Philadelphia Society for Alleviating the Miseries of Public Prisons 
(“Philadelphia Prison Society”), founded in 1787, called for the abolition of 
public labor and asked that “‘more private or even solitary labor’ be 
substituted.”266  The Philadelphia Prison Society included some of the most 
prominent members of Philadelphia, including Benjamin Rush.267  It 
fostered an international exchange of ideas over penal form, corresponding 
with John Howard, a noted English penal reformer, and embracing many of 
his ideas.268  In 1788, the Supreme Executive Council “sent a message to 
the legislature, signed by Benjamin Franklin, recommending that changes 
be made in the penal law ‘calculated to render punishment a means of 
reformation, and the labour of criminals of profit to the state. Late 
experiments in Europe have demonstrated that those advantages are only to 
be obtained by temperance, and solitude with labour.’”269 
The result of the petition from the Philadelphia Prison Society was a 
reformed criminal law in 1789 that transformed the Walnut Street Jail into a 
prison.270 During its first ten years, the program implemented at the Walnut 
Street Prison became famous throughout the colonies and internationally.  
 
development of the American state. See generally ANDREW BURSTEIN, SENTIMENTAL 
DEMOCRACY (1999); SARAH KNOTT, SENSIBILITY AND THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION (2009); 
STEPHEN MENNELL, THE AMERICAN CIVILIZING PROCESS (2007).  
266  Sellin, supra note 241, at 328.  The Philadelphia Society arose out of an early 
Society, the Philadelphia Society for Assisting Distressed Prisoners, started in 1776 to 
provide assistance to prisoners in the Walnut Street Jail.  TEETERS, supra note 156, at 19–20.  
For more on this society, see generally Negley K. Teeters, The Philadelphia Society for the 
Relief of Distressed Prisoners 1776–1777, 24 PRISON J. 452 (1944).  For more on the 
Philadelphia Prison Society, see generally NEGLEY K. TEETERS, THEY WERE IN PRISON: A 
HISTORY OF THE PENNSYLVANIA PRISON SOCIETY 1787–1937 (1937). 
267  TEETERS, supra note 266, at 4. 
268  HIRSCH, supra note 99, at 49 (explaining that this correspondence started prior to the 
Revolution); IGNATIEFF, supra note 102, at 64.  Howard’s work, State of Prisons, was 
published in 1777. TEETERS, supra note 156, at 31.  In it, Howard “advocated the 
establishment of penitentiary-houses in which each convict would be assigned his own cell, 
or room, where he would work, sleep and eat.” Id. As this example reveals, although in the 
period following the American Revolution there was a tendency to criticize all things British, 
“their Anglophobic diatribes were aimed at capital statutes and at public punishments that 
they also regarded as inexpedient.  Those diatribes notwithstanding, American criminologists 
remained eager to learn about English carceral initiatives, and they maintained an active 
correspondence with their English counterparts, including John Howard.” HIRSCH, supra 
note 99, at 49. Indeed, the same Whig radicals whose thought helped shape the ideology of 
the American Revolution were engaged in an attack on penal methods at home as well.  
IGNATIEFF, supra note 102201, at 63–64; BAILYN, supra note 9, at 40–41. 
269  Sellin, supra note 241, at 328 (quoting Minutes of the Twelfth General Assembly of 
the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 1787–1788, at 102). 
270  Skidmore, supra note 215, at 168.  
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“During the years 1790 to 1835, many international dignitaries visited this 
prison, made careful observations and established modified replicas of it in 
their various countries.”271  For example, Robert Turnbull of South Carolina 
visited and published an extensive description of the prison in 1796.272  One 
historian of the Walnut Street Jail described it as a “mecca for students of 
penal reform from various parts of the country as well as from Europe.”273  
This included an enthusiastic account of the prison written and published by 
Robert Turnball of South Carolina.274  The Philadelphia prison was held out 
as “one of the most striking emblems, of progress in refinement.”275 
Although the Walnut Street Jail began operating as a prison in 1790, it 
was not until 1794 that Pennsylvania engaged in a more extensive revision 
of its criminal law.276  An act passed that year which “set up the popular 
definition of murder in the first degree and abolished the death penalty for 
all other crimes.”277  In 1796, Virginia followed Pennsylvania in an 
extensive revision of its capital code.278  At this time, the Virginian 
governor wrote to Dr. Caspar Wistar of Philadelphia “requesting 
information about Pennsylvania’s experience as well as a copy of the plan 
for the Pennsylvania penitentiary.”279  In his request, he referred to “this 
humane law.”280  One of the sponsors of the bill described the existing 
criminal code as “‘unjust, impolitic, and barbarous.’”281 In 1796, there was 
also a pilot project prison in Rhode Island and New York that abolished 
corporal punishment.282  In 1798, a prison opened in Kentucky and in 1799, 
 
271  Id. at 167. 
272  Sellin, supra note 241, at 330. 
273  TEETERS, supra note 156, at 1.  Later he argues that “[n]ews of the sweeping reforms 
spread abroad.  British and French writers commented favorably on the new era of prison 
discipline and visitors to Philadelphia from other states wrote of the amazing results that 
flowed from the new administration.”  Id. at 36. 
274  Id. at 43. 
275  Id. at 44 (quoting from Philadelphia Monthly Magazine, Vol. I, p. 101 (Feb. 1798)). 
276  Sellin, supra note 241, at 328. 
277  Id. at 328–29. 
278  Preyer, supra note 103, at 76. 
279  Id. at 77. 
280  Id. at 77 n.89. 
281  Id. at 77 (quoting GEORGE KEITH TAYLOR, SUBSTANCE OF A SPEECH DELIVERED IN 
THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES OF VIRGINIA, ON THE BILL TO AMEND THE PENAL LAWS OF THIS 
COMMONWEALTH 7, 10–11 (1796). “He charged his colleagues with passively submitting to 
a system ‘calculated to awe and crush the humble vassals of monarchy,’ and urged them to 
revise the criminal law ‘to comport with the principles of our government.’”  Id. at 78 
(citation omitted). 
282  HIRSCH, supra note 99, at 11 n.87; MCLENNAN, supra note 99, at 37.  
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one opened in New Jersey.283  Thus, the experiment in Philadelphia started 
a process of significant changes in American penal form, as public 
inflictions of physical suffering gave way to punishments that occurred 
entirely behind walls and outside of public view. 
D. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF LATE-EIGHTEENTH CENTURY PENAL 
REFORM 
We can draw the following conclusions from these early attempts at 
penal reform.  First, penal reform was seen as an important component of 
the creation of a republican form of government.  In this, the colonists were 
without a doubt working within a comparative framework.  They wanted a 
government, and with it a criminal code, that was unlike that found in 
England and other countries in Europe.  Beyond that, however, they 
distinguished themselves from regimes that they saw as even less 
enlightened.  Terms like ‘barbaric’ or ‘savage’ were used often and had real 
content.  In discussions of penal codes, references were made to Goth and 
Vandals who were among the first ‘barbarians,’ so the term could clearly be 
understood historically, but there were also contemporary examples for 
writers to draw on, in the form of Indians, Turks, Africans, or the Native 
Americans on their own borders.  The perception Americans had of all of 
these groups, was that they used physical punishments as a means of 
terrorizing the population.284  It was in contrast to these examples that the 
early Americans sought to reform their penal codes. 
Second, the primary concern with regard to the desire to distinguish 
themselves from the English was England’s so-called “Bloody Code.”  The 
sheer number of people executed in England was seen as indicative of a 
government that relied on terror to govern its population.285  Numbers alone 
were not the only concern, however.  Also disturbing to the colonists was 
the extreme disproportionality that the code embraced.  In referring to the 
Bloody Code, it was common to point out that in England, those executed 
were not just murderers, but petty thieves as well.  Moreover, the Bloody 
Code was seen to be ineffectual because it seemed to be arbitrarily applied.  
Although the criminal statutes called for death for a wide range of offenses, 
not all of those who committed those offenses were executed because of the 
use of benefit of the clergy, pardons, and jury nullification.286 
 
283  HIRSCH, supra note 99, at 11 n.87. However, Preyer dates the New Jersey prison to 
1797. Preyer, supra note 103, at 78 n.92. 
284  See discussion supra pp. 35–38. 
285  See discussion supra p. 32. 
286  See discussion supra pp. 31–34. 
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Third, beyond the death penalty, public, physical punishments short of 
death were becoming increasingly problematic.  Shifts in penal form were 
responding in part, to long-term decreases in interpersonal violence.  This 
was a trend that spanned Europe and the colonies and extended into the 
twentieth century.  Duels, whippings, assaults—these forms of physical 
violence were becoming decreasingly socially acceptable, which in turn 
impacted the emotional response that people had to the site of public 
infliction of pain as part of a criminal punishment.  Hard labor was 
introduced as an alternative not only to the death penalty, but also to other 
public corporal punishments, such as whipping.287  In part, this arose from a 
breakdown in the communicative event that was public punishment.  
Authorities were increasingly concerned with the disorder that attended 
public punishments.  The spectators at such events no longer seemed to be 
edified by such practices.  Indeed, there was a concern that far from 
learning respect for the law they were being brutalized or made worse by 
it.288  It is here that we see a deeper concern being made manifest—to those 
in positions of authority the appropriate emotion that one should feel upon 
seeing the physical suffering of another human was sympathy.  But if this 
were the case, then public physical punishments would either elicit 
sympathy for the criminal, or, even worse, deaden the ability of the 
spectators to feel sympathy because they would be themselves brutalized by 
the public scenes of violence that punishment entailed.  Both outcomes 
were seen as problematic. 
Finally, although reform of the criminal law was seen as an important 
component of the process of fashioning a republican style of government, 
there were no clear precedents for this reform and all attempts at the local 
level were still in an experimental stage.  Although leading figures at the 
time the Bill of Rights was adopted knew that penal practice was changing, 
and they embraced and pushed for that change, they did not know what it 
would ultimately look like.  They knew what they did not want it to look 
like (England’s Bloody Code, the barbaric or savage practices of the less 
civilized), but they did not know exactly what a more enlightened practice 
would be. Private work at hard labor was starting to be embraced, and 
would soon become the dominant mechanism of punishment, but the 
development of this form of punishment was only beginning at the time the 
Bill of Rights was adopted. 
 
287  See discussion supra pp. 24–26. 
288  See discussion supra pp. 39–42. 
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III. REFRAMING CONTEMPORARY EIGHTH AMENDMENT STRUGGLES 
This Part examines how the revised history provided in Part II sheds 
light on current debates over the meaning and application of the Eighth 
Amendment.  The argument here is that even those aspects of Eighth 
Amendment jurisprudence that are treated as ahistorical or are not grounded 
in the type of historical argumentation seen in Part I have a history.  The 
use of concepts such as civilization, progress and evolution, and 
proportionality have a history routed in the late eighteenth century.  
Examining them in light of their historical context helps us to understand 
their content better and, for those scholars and justices who rely on 
originalist arguments, provides a justification for their continued relevance 
in Eighth Amendment interpretation.  The examination in this Part 
demonstrates that the Eighth Amendment was one node in a broader history 
of penal reform and change.  The Eighth Amendment was not an end point 
in this process. Rather, it was part and parcel of those broader changes.  The 
question of penal change, how and why it occurs, did not end in the 
eighteenth century. Rather, it is an ongoing process that the Eighth 
Amendment attempted to embrace instead of a set list of punishments it 
sought to eliminate.  Terms that were central to that debate in the eighteenth 
century continue to have salience and recur in discussions of the Eighth 
Amendment.  In order to fully understand and engage the Supreme Court’s 
Eighth Amendment jurisprudence, it is important to understand these key 
concepts that arose in the eighteenth century and continued to develop and 
change along their own trajectory over the following century.  This section 
starts by examining the concept of civilization and informs the 
interpretation of the Eighth Amendment context.  It then looks at the idea of 
progress or evolution and how this concept is deployed in Eighth 
Amendment jurisprudence.  The final section examines the tension between 
the concepts of proportionality and cruelty and explores the extent to which 
this occurs because of the limited view of past “cruel” punishments 
employed so often by the Supreme Court.  It is beyond the scope of this 
Article to provide an exhaustive examination of these concepts.  The 
intention is merely to underscore how the revised history of late eighteenth-
century penal change I provide can illuminate some of the persistent 
struggles and debates over the Eighth Amendment, its meaning, and its 
application. 
A. CIVILIZATION 
As discussed in Part II, the word “civilization” and the many meanings 
associated with it began to gain currency at the end of the eighteenth 
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century.289  Within this conception, penal practice at the time of the 
Founding was very much understood in international comparative terms.  
Officials understood what a reformed penal code would entail, in part by 
examining England’s “Bloody Code.”  Similarly, the various proposals for 
reform took place in the context of an international dialogue concerning 
what enlightened or civilized punishment practices were.290  Thus, rather 
than being a recent development, the understanding of cruelty or humanity 
in international comparative terms goes back to the founding period. 
For the next one hundred fifty years, civilization proved to be an 
enduring signifier of who Americans thought they were.291  It served this 
role in part by describing and distancing who they thought they were not.292 
The sense that only people less civilized than the United States would 
engage in particular forms of punishment permeates Eighth Amendment 
analysis.293  For example, a fact often overlooked in discussions of Weems 
is that it involved the United States’ administration of the Philippine 
Islands.294  The majority opinion, written by Justice McKenna, made 
numerous statements distancing the majority from a system of punishment 
designed by a foreign country and implemented in a foreign land.295  For 
example: “[i]t must be confessed that [the criminal code], and the sentence 
in this case, excite wonder in minds accustomed to a more considerate 
adaptation of punishment to the degree of crime.”296  Later, a similar 
sentiment is conveyed that someone coming from the perspective of the 
American criminal justice system would be astonished by the Philippine 
penal code: “[s]uch penalties for such offenses amaze those who have 
formed their conception of the relation of a state to even its offending 
citizens from the practice of the American commonwealths.”297  While the 
opinion is most frequently examined for its argument that penalties must be 
proportionate to the offense,298 it is important not to overlook the deliberate 
 
289  See supra Part II.C. 
290  See supra Part II.B & C. 
291  For an exhaustive examination of the use of the term “civilization” in American 
history, see generally CHARLES A. BEARD, MARY R. BEARD, 4 THE AMERICAN SPIRIT: A 
STUDY OF THE IDEA OF CIVILIZATION IN THE UNITED STATES (1942). 
292  MAZLISH, supra note 226, at 24–27. 
293  See, e.g., Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 830 (1988); Furman v. Georgia, 
408 U.S. 238, 255 (1972) (per curiam) (Douglas, J., concurring); Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 
88, 99 (1958); Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 351 (1910). 
294  Weems, 217 U.S. at 351. 
295  Id. at 365, 367. 
296  Id. at 365. 
297  Id. at 366–67.  
298  See, e.g., William W. Berry, III, Promulgating Proportionality, 46 GA. L. REV. 69, 
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distancing these arguments establish between the penal code of the 
Philippine Islands and that of the United States. The seemingly 
disproportionate sentence is shocking to Justice McKenna precisely because 
it is out of tune with American practice.  It “excite[s] wonder” in and 
“amaze[s] those who have formed their conception of the relation of a state 
to even its offending citizens from the practice of the American 
commonwealths.”299  Later in the opinion, Justice McKenna declined to 
closely examine state court decisions interpreting the meaning of cruel and 
unusual punishment because: 
It may be said of all of them that there was not such challenge to the import and 
consequence of the inhibition of cruel and unusual punishments as the law under 
consideration presents.  It has no fellow in American legislation.  Let us remember 
that it has come to us from a government of a different form and genius from ours.300 
Later in that same paragraph, he referred to it as having an “alien source.”301  
In Justice McKenna’s opinion, the American system served as the yardstick 
against which the Philippine system was found very much wanting.302 
Trop v. Dulles303 presented a different set of issues, yet also focused on 
the relationship between the penalty in question (the denationalization of 
individuals dishonorably discharged from the military for desertion) and the 
practice in civilized countries.304  Chief Justice Warren, writing for the 
majority, stated that “[t]he question is whether this penalty subjects the 
individual to a fate forbidden by the principle of civilized treatment 
guaranteed by the Eighth Amendment.”305  Later, he makes the same 
argument, assuming that in general, American practice would be considered 
“enlightened”: “[w]hile the State has the power to punish, the Amendment 
 
108–10 (2011); Schwartz & Wishingrad, supra note 1, at 796. But see Margaret Raymond, 
“No Fellow in American Legislation”: Weems v. United States and the Doctrine of 
Proportionality, 30 VT. L. REV. 251, 253–54 (2006) (arguing that the fact that Weems was 
analyzing a punishment imposed in the Philippines explains why the proportionality analysis 
applied subsequently by the Supreme Court has been so muddled). 
299  Weems, 217 U.S. at 365, 366–67. 
300  Id. at 377. 
301  Id. 
302  Justice White’s dissent also refers to practice in “any civilized country” and uses the 
foreignness of the Philippines as a justification for not judging the penal law of that country.  
Id. at 384 (White, J., dissenting) (“[A]s these considerations involve the necessity for a 
familiarity with local conditions in the Philippine Islands which I do not possess, such want 
of knowledge at once additionally admonishes me of the wrong to arise from forming a 
judgment upon insufficient data, or without a knowledge of the subject-matter upon which 
the judgment is to be exerted.”). Id. 
303  356 U.S. 86 (1958). 
304  Id. at 99. 
305  Id. at 99.  
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stands to assure that this power be exercised within the limits of civilized 
standards. . . . This Court has had little occasion to give precise content to 
the Eighth Amendment, and, in an enlightened democracy such as ours, this 
is not surprising.”306  The problem for Chief Justice Warren is that the 
penalty in question is not civilized: “[h]e may be subject to banishment, a 
fate universally decried by civilized people” and the Chief Justice knows 
this because: “[t]he civilized nations of the world are in virtual unanimity 
that statelessness is not to be imposed as punishment for crime.”307  Justice 
Frankfurter, in dissent, used the same framework of analysis, making 
factual distinctions rather than analytical ones, between the two opinions: 
“[m]any civilized nations impose loss of citizenship for indulgence in 
designated prohibited activities.”308 
A similar distinction between the practice in civilized countries and 
that believed to occur elsewhere can be seen in Justice Douglas’s 
concurrence in Furman, when he made a reference to ancient Hindu law, to 
draw an analogy to the discriminatory nature of the American death 
penalty: “a Brahman was exempt from capital punishment, and under that 
law, ‘[g]enerally, in the law books, punishment increased in severity as 
social status diminished.’  We have, I fear, taken in practice the same 
position . . . .”309  Here, Justice Douglas is establishing the contours of 
civilized practice by pointing to a jurisdiction that he assumes the reader 
will understand to be less civilized, and not desirable to emulate. 
As these examples demonstrate, the import of the word “civilization” 
is that it can only be understood in an international comparative framework.  
It embraces more than the nation-state of the United States.  This is 
confirmed in a number of cases: Justice Marshall concurring in Furman 
argued that “[o]nly in a free society could right triumph in difficult times, 
and could civilization record its magnificent advancement. . . . We achieve 
‘a major milestone in the long road up from barbarism’ and join the 
approximately 70 other jurisdictions in the world which celebrate their 
regard for civilization and humanity by shunning capital punishment.”310 
 
306  Id. at 100. 
307  Id. at 102. 
308  Id. at 126 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). 
309  Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 255 (1972) (per curiam) (Douglas, J., concurring) 
(citations omitted); see also Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 681 (1978) (describing the 
district court’s finding that the conditions in Arkansas prisons were “a dark and evil world 
completely alien to the free world” to be “amply supported”).  
310  Furman, 408 U.S. at 371 (citations omitted). He also argues for civilization being a 
process of evolution by arguing: “While England may, in retrospect, look particularly brutal, 
Blackstone points out that England was fairly civilized when compared to the rest of 
Europe.”  Id. at 334.  
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Similarly, the Court in Thompson v. Oklahoma311 explicitly connected the 
concept of civilization to practices in other countries:  
The conclusion that it would offend civilized standards of decency to execute a person 
who was less than 16 years old at the time of his or her offense is consistent with the 
views that have been expressed by respected professional organizations, by other 
nations that share our Anglo-American heritage, and by the leading members of the 
Western European community.312 
The invocation of the terms civilized or civilization in the Eighth 
Amendment context appears, however, to have fallen out of favor.  
Although Justice Kennedy recently evoked the concept in his majority 
opinion in Brown v. Plata313; prior to that opinion, the last justice to 
reference civilized standards in an Eighth Amendment context was Justice 
O’Connor in Roper v. Simmons.314  She referred to “those sanctions . . . that 
civilized society had already repudiated in 1791” and later argued that the 
Eighth Amendment draws its meaning “directly from the maturing values 
of civilized society.”315  What is noteworthy about these references is that 
unlike in Furman or Thompson, there is no explicit link made between 
civilized society and other jurisdictions, even though elsewhere, Justice 
O’Connor used statistics drawn from international practice to justify the 
outcome in the case.316  Thus, while previously the term civilization was 
evoked to refer to a group of nations all having achieved the same level of 
development, here the concept is reduced to a particular way of 
characterizing or understanding our own society. 
There is not the space in this Article to resolve precisely why this 
concept may have fallen out of favor.  I simply note that while the term 
“civilization” may have fallen into disfavor in the twenty-first century, the 
idea that the practices in comparably situated countries have relevance for 
appraising American punishment has not.  There are numerous examples of 
the Court’s (albeit controversial) reliance on international precedent in 
determining the content of evolving standards of decency: Graham v. 
 
311  487 U.S. 815 (1988). 
312  Id. at 830.  A similar argument is made by Justice Brennan, dissenting in Stanford v. 
Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 384 (1989) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“The views of organizations 
with expertise in relevant fields and the choices of governments elsewhere in the world also 
merit our attention as indicators whether a punishment is acceptable in a civilized society.”). 
313  131 S. Ct. 1910, 1928 (2011) (“A prison that deprives prisoners of basic sustenance, 
including adequate medical care, is incompatible with the concept of human dignity and has 
no place in civilized society.”). 
314  543 U.S. 551, 589, 605 (2005) (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
315  Id. at 589, 605. 
316  Id. at 604. 
1. BRAATZ 3/2/2017  2:40 PM 
460 BRAATZ [Vol. 106 
Florida,317 Roper v. Simmons,318 a footnote in Atkins v. Virginia,319 Enmund 
v. Florida,320 and Coker v. Georgia.321  While sometimes the argument is 
made in purely numerical terms (such as the argument in Coker that of sixty 
nations surveyed only three retained the death penalty for rape322), or is 
merely a generalized reference to the “other nations who share our Anglo-
American heritage”323 or simply “Western Europe,”324 the Court sometimes 
points specifically to those countries that have not abolished the death 
penalty as a means of indicating who Americans should not want to 
emulate.  For example, in dissent in Stanford, Justice Brennan listed the 
other countries in the world that have executed juveniles under eighteen: 
“Pakistan, Bangladesh, Rwanda, and Barbados.”325  Similarly, in Roper and 
Graham, the majority pointed to the fact that Article 37(a) of the United 
Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child has been ratified by every 
nation except the United States and Somalia.326  The implication is that 
 
317  130 S. Ct. 2011, 2033 (2010) (noting “support for our conclusion in the fact that, in 
continuing to impose life without parole sentences on juveniles who did not commit 
homicide, the United States adheres to a sentencing practice rejected the world over”). 
318  543 U.S. 551, 575–76 (2005) (arguing that “[o]ur determination that the death 
penalty is disproportionate punishment for offenders under 18 finds confirmation in the stark 
reality that the United States is the only country in the world that continues to give official 
sanction to the juvenile death penalty”). 
319  536 U.S. 304, 317 n.21 (2002) (pointing to the fact that “[w]ithin the world 
community, the imposition of the death penalty for crimes committed by mentally retarded 
offenders is overwhelmingly disapproved”). 
320  458 U.S. 782, 796 n.22 (1982) (finding it is “worth noting that the doctrine of felony 
murder has been abolished in England and India, severely restricted in Canada and a number 
of other Commonwealth countries, and is unknown in continental Europe”). 
321  433 U.S. 584, 596 n.10 (1977) (stating that it is “not irrelevant here that out of 60 
major nations in the world surveyed in 1965, only 3 retained the death penalty for rape 
where death did not ensue”); see, e.g., Vicki C. Jackson, Constitutional Comparisons: 
Convergence, Resistance, Engagement, 119 HARV. L. REV. 109 (2005); Joan L. Larsen, 
Importing Constitutional Norms from a “Wider Civilization”: Lawrence and the Rehnquist 
Court’s Use of Foreign and International Law in Domestic Constitutional Interpretation, 65 
OHIO ST. L. J. 1283 (2004). For a fuller discussion of the use of international precedent, see 
also Agora: The United States Constitution and International Law, 98 AM. J. INT’L L. (Lori 
Fisler Damrosch & Bernard Oxman eds., 2004). 
322  433 U.S. at 596 n.10; see also Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 371 (1972) 
(Marshall, J., concurring) (noting seventy countries that have abolished the death penalty). 
323  Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 830 (1988). 
324  Id.; see also Enmund, 458 U.S. at 796 n.22 (referring to Commonwealth countries 
and continental Europe). 
325  Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 389 (1989) (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
326  Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2034 (2010); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 
576 (2005). This article prohibits the imposition of either the death penalty or “life 
imprisonment without possibility of release . . . for offences committed by persons below 
eighteen years of age.” Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2034. 
1. BRAATZ 3/2/2017  2:40 PM 
2016] THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT’S MILIEU 461 
these are not countries that the United States would want to be compared to.  
They are, in other words, not civilized.  Thus, the Court has moved from 
explicit references to barbaric versus civilized practices to comparing those 
countries that have embraced particular practices versus those who have 
rejected them. This leaves implicit the judgment that those practices and the 
societies that embrace them are not civilized. 
These international comparisons largely occur in the context of death 
penalty cases.  With the exception of juvenile life-imprisonment without the 
possibility of parole, they have not made their way into the imprisonment 
cases, even though such a comparison could be made, with regard to length 
of sentences, types of crimes so punished, and conditions of confinement.327  
In part this could be a result of the complexity of the analysis that would be 
required to conduct a comparative study with regard to sentence length.328  
It could also be a result of the terms by which sentences of imprisonment 
are evaluated by the Court (as involving questions of proportionality rather 
than cruelty).  The history of Founding thought outlined in Part II, however, 
as well as the Court’s continued embrace of the relevance of international 
comparison suggests that this would be a fruitful line of argument for 
advocates. The Founders had a narrative of what it meant to be a republic 
that embraced a distinction between the “despotic” monarchical practices of 
England and the more rational approach advocated for the republic.  Their 
definition of a republic entailed a government that valued its citizens and 
avoided subjecting them to a “Bloody Code.”  A similar narrative could be 
drawn today in discussions of the United States’ extreme departure from 
international practice in terms of our use of imprisonment.  Terms such as 
civilization may no longer be common but there continues to be a sense that 
the United States aspires to treat its citizens better than may be the case 
under harsher forms of government (as seen in the negative comparisons to 
practices in Pakistan, Bangladesh, Rwanda, Barbados, and Somalia).  The 
 
327  See, e.g., James P. Lynch & William Alex Pridemore, Crime in International 
Perspective, in CRIME AND PUBLIC POLICY 5 (James Q. Wilson & Joan Petersilia eds. 2011); 
Marc Mauer, The International Use of Incarceration, 75 PRISON J. 113 (1995). But see James 
Lynch, A Cross-National Comparison of the Length of Custodial Sentences for Serious 
Crimes, 10 JUST. Q. 639 (1993) (finding that when crime rates are controlled for, the “time 
served in the United States for violent crimes is similar to that in other industrialized 
democracies”). 
328  See, e.g., Gordon C. Barclay, The Comparability of Data on Convictions and 
Sanctions: Are International Comparisons Possible?, 8 EUROPEAN J. CRIM. POL. & 
RESEARCH 13 (2000) (examining the various complications involved in comparing 
sentencing data among European nations); Warren Young & Mark Brown, Cross-national 
Comparisons of Imprisonment, 17 CRIME & JUST. 1 (1993) (discussing techniques for 
creating meaningful cross-national comparisons of imprisonment). 
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significance of these comparisons, first to the practice among civilized 
countries and then simply among the international community, is in part 
that they can be traced back to the Founding belief that civilization and 
America’s development along the continuum from barbaric to savage to 
civilized required a reformed penal practice, one that was less cruel and 
more rational than that found in the “old world.” 
B. PROGRESS AND EVOLUTION 
The concept of civilization is closely linked to the concept of progress 
or evolution and was seen as a state achieved after savagery or barbarism.329 
The idea of progress or evolution is deeply imbedded in the Court’s Eighth 
Amendment jurisprudence.  Trop contained the now oft repeated maxim: 
“The Amendment must draw its meaning from the evolving standards of 
decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.”330 There are 
numerous references in the early cases to this evolution, such as Justice 
Stewart’s in Robinson v. California,331 who argued that “[i]t is unlikely that 
any State at this moment in history would attempt to make it a criminal 
offense for a person to be mentally ill, or a leper, or to be afflicted with 
venereal disease.”332  Justice Blackmun made reference to this idea of 
evolution in his dissent in Furman, stating that the majority decision could 
be seen to be “the compassionate decision for a maturing society” or that 
“we are moving down the road toward human decency,” or “that we are less 
 
329  See, e.g., MENNELL, supra note 265, at 26–28 (citing Jefferson’s use of “civilization” 
frequently in conjunction with “other symptoms of progress”). For example: 
Let a philosophic observer commence a journey from the savages of the Rocky Mountains, 
eastwardly towards our seacoast. These he would observe in the earliest stage of association 
living under no law but that of nature, subsisting and covering themselves with the flesh and 
skins of wild beasts. He would next find those on our frontiers in the pastoral state, raising 
domestic animals to supply the defects of hunting. Then succeed our own semi-barbarous 
citizens, the pioneers of the advance of civilization, and so in his progress he would meet the 
gradual shades of improving man until he would reach his, as yet, most improved state in our 
seaport towns. This, in fact, is equivalent to a survey, in time, of the progress of many from the 
infancy of creation to the present day. I am eighty-one years of age; born where I now live, in the 
first range of mountains in the interior of our country. And I have observed this march of 
civilization advancing from the seacoast, passing over us like a cloud of light, increasing our 
knowledge and improving our condition, insomuch as that we are at this time more advanced in 
civilization here than the seaports were when I was a boy. And where this progress will stop no 
one can say. Barbarism has, in the meantime, been receding before the steady step of 
amelioration; and will in time, I trust, disappear from the earth. 
Id. at 27 (quoting JEFFERSON, supra note 66, at 75).  
330  356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958).  
331  370 U.S. 660 (1962). 
332  Id. at 666 (emphasis added). 
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barbaric than we were.”333 So pervasive is the concept of progress that 
Justice Powell, also dissenting in Furman, declared: “It is, however, within 
the historic process of constitutional adjudication to challenge the 
imposition of the death penalty in some barbaric manner.”334  He then went 
on to delineate changing sensibilities with regard to penal practice: “Neither 
the Congress nor any state legislature would today tolerate pillorying, 
branding, or cropping or nailing of the ears—punishments that were in 
existence during our colonial era. . . . Similarly, there may well be a process 
of evolving attitude with respect to the application of the death sentence for 
particular crimes.”335  Thus, although Powell did not think that evolving 
standards had progressed to the point of opposing any sentence of death, he 
did not disagree with the notion that sensibilities could and do change. 
Even while concepts of progress and evolution pervade the Eighth 
Amendment cases, there has been a significant shift in how both scholars 
and the justices think of penal reform and progress.  For over a century and 
a half following the Founding, the story of penal reform was told as one of 
progressive humanitarianism.336  Starting with revisionist historians in the 
1970s,337 however, that narrative of progress and change has increasingly 
come into question. It should be noted that the argument made in Part II is 
in marked contrast to how the history of the prison has been told since the 
1970s.338 Starting with the work of David Rothman in the United States, 
 
333  Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 410 (1972) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).  The fact 
that he is dissenting does not mean that he does not believe in progress.  For example, his 
argument can also be seen in his argument that the Court’s decision might require mandatory 
death sentences: “[t]his approach, it seems to me, encourages legislation that is regressive 
and of an antique mold, for it eliminates the element of mercy in the imposition of 
punishment.  I thought we had passed beyond that point in our criminology long ago.” Id. at 
413. 
334  Id. at 420 (Powell, J., dissenting). 
335  Id. at 430. 
336  See generally Michael Ignatieff, State, Civil Society, and Total Institutions: A 
Critique of Recent Social Histories of Punishment, in SOCIAL CONTROL AND THE STATE 
(Stanley Cohen & Andrew Scull eds., 1983). 
337  See generally FOUCAULT, supra note 81; IGNATIEFF, supra, note 102201; ROTHMAN, 
supra note 159. 
338  For a critique of these historical debates, see Preyer, supra note 100, at 251.   
Recent revisionist scholarship has tended to minimize the reformist impulse of the eighteenth 
century, attributing change instead to economic factors alone, or to the necessity for social 
control of the populace by ruling groups, or to the relationship between the origins of the modern 
prison and the formation of the modern state. Such interpretations have offered healthy 
correctives to earlier models that explained change solely in terms of the ideas of humanitarian 
reformers divorced from the social context in which historical change inevitably takes place.  
Yet, does the social context have no room for the examination of changed modes of thinking, of 
perceiving reality? No room for examining the role of those who convey that alteration of 
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and Michel Foucault in France, contemporary historians have focused on 
the prison as a development unique to the nineteenth century.339 Foucault’s 
account of a sharp contrast between pre-modern penalties, with his graphic 
description of a man being drawn and quartered, and modern, disciplinary 
penalties, is the most well-known of these revisionist accounts.340 Both 
Foucault and Rothman emphasize the internal arrangements of the 
penitentiary as its distinguishing characteristic.341 The discussion in Part II 
reveals that these accounts oversimplify how and when penal change occurs 
and rely upon a misleading dichotomy between “modern” and “pre-
modern” penalties.  Only by recognizing the significant changes in penal 
form that were already occurring at the end of the eighteenth century, as 
well as how those changes played into the larger narrative of the place of 
penal change within the creation of the American republic, can we begin to 
grasp the tenuous basis of any purported distinction between the modern 
and pre-modern. 
It is not just that historians began to call into question the narrative of 
progressive humanitarianism embraced by penal reformers, however.  
David Garland points to a “pervasive sense of failure, fuelled by the sharply 
increasing crime rates of the 1970s and 1980s,” that “would eventually lead 
to a questioning of the state’s ability to control crime and a rethinking of the 
role of criminal justice.”342  This “sense of failure,” meant that “the criminal 
justice system came to be viewed primarily in terms of its limitations and 
propensity for failure rather than its prospects for future success.”343  Thus, 
the progressive narrative of penal reform was attacked by historians at the 
same time that the efficacy of the criminal justice system came under 
attack.  Within this new crime control culture, there was a marked decline 
in belief in progress. 
As with the concept of civilization, the Supreme Court has failed to 
embrace a notion of evolution or progress in Eighth Amendment prison 
cases.  In part, this could be a result of how the narrative of penal progress 
has typically unfolded, with the prison standing in contrast to past, clearly 
cruel, punishments.  On its face, that narrative leaves little room for an 
 
sensibility that in itself becomes an historical artifact, even though less subject to empirical 
quantitative analysis than other data?  
Id. 
339   See generally  FOUCAULT, supra note 81; ROTHMAN, supra note 159. 
340   FOUCAULT, supra note 81, at 3–7. 
341  Id. at 6–31; ROTHMAN, supra note 159, at 79–108.  
342  DAVID GARLAND, THE CULTURE OF CONTROL: CRIME AND SOCIAL ORDER IN 
CONTEMPORARY SOCIETY 62 (2002). 
343  Id. at 107. 
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understanding of progressive prison reform.  This might also be attributed 
to the changing culture of control, in which there is no longer a faith that 
the state can or should implement a prison regime that accomplishes 
anything beyond incapacitation.  Of course this is not to say that the Eighth 
Amendment has no application in the prison context, far from it.  It is only 
to point out that there is little mention of progress or evolution in the 
context of discussion of prison policies. 
Within the context of the death penalty, however, the narrative of 
progress or evolution continues, and it provides the primary justifications 
for a number of cases, including Coker, Enmund, Atkins, Roper, Graham, 
and Miller.  Yet, the methods that the Court uses to divine the evolving 
standards of decency have opened the door to a notion of evolution that is 
willing to contemplate regression.  This can be seen most clearly in 
Kennedy v. Louisiana,344 in which there was some debate regarding the 
significance of the fact that six jurisdictions had recently made rape of a 
child a capital offense.345  The majority failed to hold that evolving 
standards could not go in the direction of expanding the death penalty.346  
The dissent, on the other hand, indicated that they believed such a reading 
could certainly be plausible.347  Justice Scalia, in dissent, noted that six 
states had enacted new child-rape laws since 1977: 
I do not suggest that six new state laws necessarily establish a “national consensus” or 
even that they are sure evidence of an ineluctable trend.  In terms of the Court’s 
metaphor of moral evolution, these enactments might have turned out to be an 
evolutionary dead end.  But they might also have been the beginning of a strong new 
evolutionary line.  We will never know, because the Court today snuffs out the line in 
its incipient stages.348 
Although Justice Scalia evokes the concept of evolution, he decouples it 
from the idea of progress.  Under his account, evolution could occur in any 
direction, even towards a harsher system of punishment. 
A related argument was made by Chief Justice Roberts, dissenting in 
 
344  554 U.S. 407 (2008). 
345  Id. at 431–33 (analyzing the question of whether six states adopting the death penalty 
for child rape constituted a “direction of change” in support of that penalty). 
346  Id. at 431 (“Whatever the significance of consistent change where it is cited to show 
emerging support for expanding the scope of the death penalty, no showing of consistent 
change has been made in this case.”).  Similar hesitancy can be seen in Justice Sotomayor’s 
dissent in Glossip v. Gross, in which she argued that “[c]ertainly, use of the firing squad 
could be seen as a devolution to a more primitive era” but then went on the assert “[t]hat is 
not to say, of course, that it would therefore be unconstitutional.” 135 S. Ct. 2726, 2796–97 
(2015) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
347  Kennedy, 554 U.S. at 461 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
348  Id. 
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Miller v. Alabama,349 when he argued that “[a]s judges we have no basis for 
deciding that progress towards greater decency can move only in the 
direction of easing sanctions on the guilty.”350  Indeed, he argued that “[i]n 
this case, there is little doubt about the direction of society’s evolution” and 
went on the point to the fact that for most of the century, life without parole 
was not an option and it was only starting in the 1980s when “outcry 
against repeat offenders, broad disaffection with the rehabilitative model, 
and other factors led many legislatures to reduce or eliminate the possibility 
of parole.”351  It is thus an open question whether evolution must always go 
in one direction. 
This dispute is in part the result of a sustained critique by certain 
justices of the very notion of evolving standards of decency.  One precursor 
to the Kennedy debate can be found in Justice Scalia’s relentless 
questioning of any narrative of change.  For example, in Thompson, Justice 
Scalia characterized the majority’s argument as stating “that a 4-decade 
trend is adequate to justify calling a constitutional halt to what may well be 
a pendulum swing in social attitudes.”352 Instead, he argued that there were 
many explanations for change that have nothing to do with changing 
sensibilities of the American people: “[t]here are many reasons that 
adequately account for the drop in executions other than the premise of 
general agreement that no 15-year-old murderer should ever be 
executed.”353 Similarly, dissenting in Atkins, Justice Scalia argued: 
The Eighth Amendment is addressed to always-and-everywhere “cruel” punishments, 
such as the rack and the thumbscrew.  But where the punishment is in itself 
permissible “[t]he Eighth Amendment is not a ratchet, whereby a temporary 
consensus on leniency for a particular crime fixes a permanent constitutional 
maximum, disabling the States from giving effect to altered beliefs and responding to 
changed social conditions.”354 
In this, we see the heart of Justice Scalia’s critique and a question that is 
embraced by other Justices, including Chief Justice Roberts: Does change 
always go in the direction of less harshness?  Once society has evolved to a 
 
349  132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012). 
350  Id. at 2478. 
351  Id. Chief Justice Roberts argues that “most States have changed their laws relatively 
recently to expose teenage murderers to mandatory life without parole.” Id. Similarly, Justice 
Alito, also dissenting in Miller (with Justice Scalia joining) asked: “Is it true that our society 
is inexorably evolving in the direction of greater and greater decency? Who says so, and how 
did this particular philosophy of history find its way into our fundamental law?” Id. at 2487. 
352  487 U.S. 815, 869 (1988).  
353  Id. 
354  536 U.S. 338, 349 (2002) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 
U.S. 957, 990 (1991)). 
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particular level of sensibilities with regard to punishment, could it go back? 
In contrast to his opinion in Miller, Chief Justice Roberts heartily 
embraced a conception of progress when writing for the majority in Baze, 
where he made repeated references to the “more humane means of carrying 
out the sentence” and argued “that progress has led to the use of lethal 
injection by every jurisdiction that imposes the death penalty.”355  He 
argued that the states had fulfilled their legislative function “with an earnest 
desire to provide for a progressively more humane manner of death.”356  
Indeed, Chief Justice Roberts’s opinion seems to rely upon a belief in the 
concept of progress as integral to the determination of the Eighth 
Amendment’s scope.  If there is an alternative procedure that is “feasible, 
readily implemented, and in fact significantly reduce[s] a substantial risk of 
severe pain” then a state’s refusal to adopt “such an alternative in the face 
of these documented advantages, without a legitimate penological 
justification for adhering to its current method of execution, then a State’s 
refusal to change its method can be viewed as ‘cruel and unusual’ under the 
Eighth Amendment.”357 
Much more work can and should be done to evaluate the Court’s 
jurisprudence regarding evolving standards of decency.  My intention in 
this Article is merely to underline the fact that from the founding moment, a 
particular conception of progress was central to understandings of the 
Eighth Amendment. It held that as America created a republic and thereby 
became more civilized, its penal code would become less harsh.  Indeed, 
this was understood to be a defining difference between a monarchy and a 
republic.358  This conception of the relevance of progress for evaluating 
penal form has been called into question, starting in the second half of the 
twentieth century.  The Court’s jurisprudence in this regard appears 
muddled, I suggest, because its members, in marked contrast to the 
Founders, do not share a unitary conception of what progress entails. 
C. PROPORTIONALITY VERSUS CRUELTY 
Civilization is also connected to another aspect of the enduring legacy 
of eighteenth-century penal reform on Eighth Amendment interpretation—
the place of the body in understanding cruelty.  Part II emphasized the 
extent to which the penal reform pursued in the late eighteenth century 
 
355  553 U.S. 35, 41 (2008) (Roberts, C.J., concurring; Kennedy, J., and Alito, J., 
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1. BRAATZ 3/2/2017  2:40 PM 
468 BRAATZ [Vol. 106 
focused almost exclusively on eliminating public, physical punishments.359  
As was outlined in the above discussion of Pennsylvania’s experiment with 
public hard labor, this reflects changing sensibilities towards the sight of 
physical violence imposed on the body. 
This understanding that cruelty is somehow closely linked to physical 
violence can be seen in Supreme Court cases.  For example, in his dissent in 
O’Neil, Justice Field argued that if the punishment in question involved 
whipping instead of a term of imprisonment then “a cry of horror would rise 
from every civilized and Christian community of the country against it.”360  
This “cry of horror” is an expression of a particular sensibility towards 
violence inflicted on the body.  References to sensibilities continued well 
into the twentieth century, although the term itself is not used the concept 
can be seen in expressions of a way of feeling about a particular 
punishment. Civilization itself was frequently used as a shorthand for 
particular sensibilities.  Central to this idea of sensibilities is the fact that 
they are expressed as a way of feeling.  Thus, Supreme Court justices 
frequently referenced civilization in their opinions to characterize ineffable 
qualities that distinguish those who tolerate particular punishments from 
those who do not.361  Justice Douglas, concurring in Robinson,  argued that 
“[t]he Eighth Amendment expresses the revulsion of civilized man against 
barbarous acts—the ‘cry of horror’ against man’s inhumanity to his fellow 
man.”362  Similarly, Justice Burton, dissenting in Resweber, argued that 
“[t]aking human life by unnecessarily cruel means shocks the most 
fundamental instincts of civilized man.”363  Justice Marshall in Ford v. 
Wainwright364 referred to the “natural abhorrence civilized societies feel at 
 
359  See supra Part II.C. 
360  O’Neil v. Vermont, 144 U.S. 323, 340 (1892) (Field, J., dissenting). 
361  See supra pp. 48–50. 
362  Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 676 (1962) (Douglas, J., concurring). Brennan 
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364  477 U.S. 399 (1986). 
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killing” the insane and stated that “such an execution simply offends 
humanity.”365  In all of these examples, the concept of “civilization” 
expresses an ineffable quality that relates to our ability to feel horror and 
shock at the sight of the pain and suffering of the human body. 
At the same time, because late eighteenth-century reforms were not 
only about reducing bodily violence but also about privatizing 
punishment,366 the public no longer “sees” the punishment.  For this reason, 
the process of civilization that calls forth feelings of abhorrence may be 
short-circuited by the very civilizing process that helped create those 
feelings in the first place.  The instances where the Court has found an 
Eighth Amendment violation in the prison context generally involve 
examples of the Court uncovering instances of physical mistreatment.367  
The most recent decision in Brown underscores this point.  Kennedy’s 
opinion is full of examples of the physical suffering of the prisoners as a 
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result of overcrowding.368  Indeed, the opinion includes three photographs 
of conditions inside California prisons so that we can “see” the 
mistreatment.369  Not unrelatedly, Kennedy’s opinion is an exception to 
recent trends as it explicitly evokes standards of civilized society. 
While the previous examples linked civilization with a feeling of 
abhorrence when confronted with particular penal practices, later opinions 
explicitly reference when pain may be imposed.  Justice Brennan, 
concurring in Furman, argued that “[t]he primary principle is that 
punishment must not be so severe as to be degrading to the dignity of 
human beings.  Pain, certainly, may be a factor in the judgment.”370  Later, 
he argued that “death remains as the only punishment that may involve the 
conscious infliction of physical pain.”371 Roberts, discussing what he 
perceives to be the growing humanity of the manners in which the death 
penalty is imposed in the United States, distinguishes the practice from 
what occurred historically: “[w]hat each of the forbidden punishments had 
in common was the deliberate infliction of pain for the sake of pain—
‘superadd[ing]’ pain to the death sentence through torture and the like.”372 
One result of this approach has been that in order to find a violation of 
the Eighth Amendment, the Court requires some analogy between the 
punishment in question and torture.  For example, in Trop: “It is a form of 
punishment more primitive than torture, for it destroys for the individual the 
political existence that was centuries in the development.”373  This point 
was explicitly rejected by the dissenters: “The very substantial rights and 
privileges that the alien in this country enjoys under the federal and state 
constitutions puts him in a very different condition from that of an outlaw in 
fifteenth-century England.”374  Kennedy’s concurrence in Davis v. Ayala375 
suggests a similar approach with regard to solitary confinement, creating an 
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analogy with torture.376 
The result is an ambiguous application of the Eighth Amendment in 
imprisonment cases.  There is a distinction between the cases that examine 
prison conditions and contemplated the possibility of or actually found 
Eighth Amendment violations, and length of sentence cases that have 
almost uniformly failed to find Eighth Amendment violations.377  This is 
because the former focus on the concept of cruelty and its relationship to 
the physical infliction of pain on the body of the offender, whereas the latter 
focus on proportionality and leave cruelty almost entirely out of the 
equation.  If, however, cruelty is not to be limited to a particular set of 
punishments present at the Founding, and instead represents the process by 
which types of punishment come to be seen as cruel, then its application 
ought not to be limited to situations that involve the physical application of 
pain to the prisoner’s body.  Rather, advocates need to develop ways of 
discussing extreme deprivations of time with society, family, and 
community in terms of cruelty.  In this way, application of the Eighth 
Amendment to length of sentence should be expanded beyond examinations 
of proportionality, which the Court has found to be less than illuminating. 
CONCLUSION 
Perhaps the most important thing that we can say about the Eighth 
Amendment is that it exists. Penal form played a key role in late eighteenth-
century understandings of what it meant to be a republic, what it meant to 
be civilized, and what it meant to be a person capable of proper feeling vis à 
vis other members of the society.  It is for these reasons that the protections 
included in the Eighth Amendment were considered important enough to 
include in the Bill of Rights.  This Article departs from histories of the 
Eighth Amendment that tend to treat particular penal methods in a static 
way—as though the only distinction that can be drawn is between the so-
called Stuart horrors and eighteenth-century penal practice.378  Part II 
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demonstrated that the final two decades of the eighteenth century were 
marked by significant changes in penal form as state legislatures sought to 
shape the criminal law and penal practice into a form they deemed more 
appropriate to a civilized and republican government.379  Beyond this, 
however, Part II demonstrated that these discussions were part of a larger 
change in sensibilities that related to how people thought about the public 
infliction of pain.  Understanding these aspects of the history illuminate 
aspects of contemporary debates over the Eighth Amendment, including the 
use of international comparison, debates over the question of progress and 
how it occurs, and the use of proportionality rather than cruelty in 
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